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Abstract
This thesis attempts to analyze the problematic nature of
Canada's defence policy by utilizing general systems theory as the
prime method of inquiry.

While much of the existing literature on

Canadian defence policy is of a singular or partial nature, there
is a need for a more holistic approach to the study of defence policy.
General systems theory, being a normative theory with a
scientific base, assumes a holistic approach while offering explanations in behavioural phenomena as well as indicating possible future
conditions.
This thesis examines the past and present of Canadian defence
policy as seen in the perspective of ever-changing political,
strategic and military conditions prevailing in the international
systems environment.

In a developmental sense, this analysis should

be regarded as an ongoing process whereby a general theory has been
utilized to explain and interpret existing data in such a way as to
arrive at a new synthesis in the search for human knowledge.
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CHAPTER I

The Scope and Method of Inquiry

General Statement:
Canada's defence policy has shown itself to be problematic in
nature as indicated by a long line of crisis situations that have
occurred throughout the years. At present, no available inquiry on
Canadian defence policy has utilized any particular scientific method
to perform the dual functions of both explanation and recommendation.
General systems theory is one particular scientific method of inquiry
that enables the inquirer to make certain normative statements of
recommendation while still obeying the demands of scientific analysis.
The use of general systems theory to study the problematic nature of
Canadian defence policy places the singular problem of defence in its
broadest of all possible perspectives.

(1) An Analysis of The Problem
The first stage of any political inquiry is to observe those
relevant facts that indicate that there is a problem worthy of such
an inquiry.

Secondly, relevant hypotheses should be drawn from the

analysis of those facts which indicate the problem.

F. S. Northrop, The Logic of The Sciences and The Humanities, Cleveland; The
World Publishing Co., 1947, p. 29.

2.

But what is it that makes a problem appear as requiring further
inquiry? Philosopher John Dewey considered

a problem to be a problem
2

at the point that it was recognized as such.

Although Dewey con-

firmed that problem perception begins on a highly subjective level,
inquiry begins when the individual observer finds something to be unsatisfactory.

Inquiry can result from a physical experience or the

acquisition of new information that makes traditional values and beliefs
3
inadequate or places those values and beliefs in question.
Therefore
having a problem is the first and necessary step in any inquiry.

For

without a problem, there is no need to carry out such an inquiry.
Once a problem has been recognized as a 'problematic situation',
it must be reduced to those relevant facts that gave rise to the problem
4
in the first place. What this infers is a comprehensive description
of those relevant facts that would indicate to the outside observer that
a problem does indeed exist.

In the political inquiry being attempted

in this thesis, there are certain relevant facts that will be stated to
indicate that Canada's defence policy is a problematic situation worthy
of further inquiry.
There are certain documented case situations and relevant facts
which indicate the problematic nature of Canada's defence policy.
During the Cuban missile crisis in late 1962, Canada found her

2
John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston
Publishing Company, 1938, p. 108.
3
F. S. Northrop, Op. cit., p. 17.
Ibid., p. 34.

defence policy to be 'futile and unequal to an emergency situation'.
For example, Canada's armed forces were put on national alert a full
forty-eight hours after the United States had placed its

military

forces on full national alert. Throughout the whole crisis situation,
Canadian Bomarc missiles without

nuclear warheads, remained on the

ground virtually useless for any counter-offensive strategy. As a
result, Canada's defence against a Soviet nuclear attack relied solely
on the reliability of the United States' massive second strike capability,
namely its ICBM's and its missile launching submarines to counter this
7
threat.
This dependence on the United States offensive capability corresponds with the generally held belief that the United States is geographically committed to the defence of Canada.

Although there is a

certain amount of logic in this belief, there is an equal amount
of scepticism surrounding any such obvious truism.

Since the early

sixties, significant advances in weapons technology have placed in
question those strategic arguments surrounding the long-range bomber
as the chief weapon.

These changes in weapons technology and resultant

R. Reford, Canada and Three Crises, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International
Affairs, 1968, p. 3.
6
Peyton Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963, Vol. XII, Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1968, p. 45.
7
Lieutenant General E. M. Burns, Defence in The Nuclear Age: An Introduction
For Canadians, Toronto: Clarke Irwin Publishing Co., 1976, p. 116.
Q

General R. J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation" in International Journal (C11A) Vol. XVII, 1961/62. p. 217
It is interesting to note that General Sutherland's remarks were made prior to
the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962.

4.

strategies have played havoc with the Department of National Defence in
its attempt to find an all-purpose weapon to substitute for the lack
of a sound long range defence policy.

9

Secondly, Canadian defence policy and other related issues have
precipitated a series of major political crises throughout Canadian
history.

The conscription crises of 1917 and 1944, the controversial

NORAD debate of 1957, the cancellation of the Avro-Arrow project in
1958 and the moral dilemma surrounding the nuclear weapons debate of
the early sixties constitute
Canada's defence policy.

the type of crises that have sprung from

Both the nature of these crises and the

frequency with which they occurred would seem to indicate that further
inquiry into the whole area of national defence is warranted.
Furthermore, there exists a general sense of confusion over
what role Canada's defence policy should fulfil in terms of her foreign
policy.

Repeatedly, Canadian political decision makers have stated

unequivocally that Canada's defence policy is 'derived directly from
10
her foreign policy'.
Although this position would seem to represent
what various Canadian governments intend to be the ideal, the past

John Sheltus, Toronto Star Magazine, Saturday, August 14, 1977, p. 12.
Since unification of the Canadian armed forces in 1964, the Canadian
government has religiously pursued weapons buying with cost effectiveness
being the most influential factor in determining weapons choices. As a
result, Canada's weapons arsenal offers limited supportive capability to its
defensive obligations abroad. For example, the 'new' German Leopard I tank
purchased by the Canadian government has become virtually obsolete before
it could realize any appreciable use in the field. The CF-104 Starfighter
was purchased in the early sixties with the purpose of fulfilling Canada's
nuclear role in NATO but has required expensive moderation to match the
governments desire to go non-nuclear in 1972.
The
Honourable George Pearkes, Minister of National Defence, April
1959, as quoted in R. Reford's "Making Defence Policy in Canada" in Behind
The Headlines, Vol. XXIII (December, 1963), p. 15.

record has shown that the ideal has seldom corresponded to reality.
NATO had in reality determined all of our defence
policy. We had no defence policy, so to speak,
except that of NATO. And our defence policy had
determined all of our foreign policy. And we had
no foreign policy of any importance except that
which flowed from NATO... It is a false perspective
to have a military alliance determine your foreign
policy. It should be your foreign policy which
determines your military policy."-^
As a result of the confusion surrounding this whole relationship
between Canada's defence policy and her foreign policy, there is a
further problem of 'priorities' involved when two groups compete for
the same resources.
flowing from

12

If the government perceives defence policy as

foreign policy, then Canada's defence needs are

channelled through foreign policy objectives which tend by their very
nature to be 'ill-defined and capable of systematic expression only
in terms of generalities.'

13

Defence policy, unlike foreign policy, must be expressed in more
precise terms as to be operational on a daily basis while foreign
policy can assume more long range objectives.

In this sense, Canada's

defence policy and foreign policy have grown so far apart from each other
as to be counter productive in their respective efforts to accomplish

11
The Right Honourable Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, Statements
and Speeches, Ottawa: Oueen's Printer, April 12, 1969, p. 4.
12
Denis Stairs, "The Military as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy"
in H. Massey (ed.), The Canadian Military: A Profile, Toronto: Copp-Clarke
Publishing Company, 1972, p. 91.
13

Ibid, p. 87

similar objectives.
Much of the research that has been done on Canada's defence policy
has only partially succeeded in doing what is required for a truly
scientific inquiry.

The mere observation of the relevant facts surroun-

ding any problem does not necessarily infer solutions to that problem.
"The purpose of defence policy analysis as of
all science, is to generate accurate predictions i.e. estimates of what will happen in
the future based on characteristics of the
present and past."15
Since many of the observations on Canadian defence policy span
so many areas with such complexity, some theoretical framework is
required to give these observations meaning.

It is at this point in

the inquiry that the application of theory and related hypotheses can
play a significant part in furthering analysis. For 'theoretically
inferred knowledge' is as essential to the process of inquiry as
'immediately apprehended knowledge'.

(2) The Use of Theory
Once a factual analysis of the problem has been completed by
a description of the relevant facts, the problem may still remain unresolved.

It becomes apparent that something beyond the mere observation

Andrew Brewin, Stand On Guard: The Search For a Canadian Defence Policy,
Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Publishing Company, 1965, p. 118.
15
Davis Bobrow, The Components of Defence Policy, Chicago: Rand McNally
Publishing Company, 1965, p. 2.
F. S. Northrop, Op cit., p. 39.

of facts must be introduced into the inquiry. Most problems that are
subjected to inquiry suggest certain explanations or solutions based
upon the subject matter and the previous knowledge available to the
inquirer. When these suggested explanations are translated into
propositions, they are referred to as hypotheses.

17

The introduction of concepts and hypotheses can bring order
to a large collection of relevant facts but theorizing through the
use of hypotheses can result in aimless wandering unless the systematic demands of scientific method are imposed upon the inquiry.

18

The application of scientific method to any inquiry infers that
certain facts are selected as relevant while other facts are excluded
as being irrelevant. A continuous buildup of knowledge occurs throughout this process of moving from facts to theory to principle to new
19
facts, new theories and new principles.
At each level of inquiry,
a new theory based upon a broader interconnection of the facts will
be drawn upon until the widest possible connection of the facts has
been achieved.
The use of theory can be significant in developing human knowledge.
The ideal type of theory, if any 'ideal' type could be found, would be
capable of attaining the highest level of inquiry by connecting
all the relevant facts while being firmly grounded in the

M. R. Cohen, E. Nagel, An Introduction To Logic and Scientific Method,
New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1934, pp. 200-201.
18

Ibid, p. 394.
Ibid, p. 396.

pure sciences. However, the pure sciences restrict themselves to directly observable entities and relations thus becoming descriptive and
incapable of making predictions.

20

It is scientific theory that speculates about facts
and their relationships with each other while the pure sciences remain
chained to observing the invariant relationships between objects.
"A scientific theory defines phenomena and
their relations through a set of propositions
organized in a deductive logical form, from
which are deduced general statements which
assert that, given specific conditions and
„..
relationships, specific conclusions will ensue."
However, most types of scientific theory are limited in both their
scope and method of inquiry.

The 'physical' scientific theories are

confined to the mechanistic explanation of observable phenomena no matter
22
how complex such a mechanism may be.

The abstract or 'mathematical'

scientific theories attempt to draw out general principles by abstracting
relations from the observable facts.

23

In the area of political inquiry, many of the scientific theories
that are empirically based tend to be partial theories that converge on
some central point, each specifying one of the factors which plays a part

20
F. S. Northrop, Op cit., p. 115.
21
Charles Reynolds, Theory and Explanation in International Politics, New
York: Barnes and Noble Publishers, 1973, p. 322.
22
M. Cohen, E. Nagel, Op cit., p. 398
23
Ibid, p. 397

9.

24
in the phenomenon which the theory is to explain.

Partial theories

can be important for increasing human knowledge in the summative sense
but they are found to be lacking in adding to our constituent knowledge
of things and how they relate to each other as a whole. Also, there is
limited understanding of what relationship these partial theories have
25
with each other.
What is needed in the field of political inquiry is the development of a general theory which would span all aspects of the inquiry
while still explaining the specifics of the problem at hand,

Canada's

defence policy is one such problem area that could be more fully understood if its singular generalizations were interpreted in terms of
26
how political systems function in their entirety.
It is in this context of developing a general theory that general

24
A. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology For Behaviorial Science,
San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964, p. 298.
For example, the decision-making approach as developed by R. Snyder, H.
Bruck and B. Sapin in their book, Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach
To The Study of International Politics, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe,
1962, confines itself to one central process that occurs within the political
system, namely decision-making (i.e. voting, legislating, administrating and
adjudicating). The authors argue that there is not enough 'empirical data
and preliminary conceptualization' to provide the basis for a general theory
of international politics. It would seem to be their view that if enough
partial theories could be developed to fill those gaps in human knowledge,
then some type of general theory could be realized. This point of view is
logical in the sense that most human knowledge has been derived from the
building of new theories and hypotheses on top of older established theories
and hypotheses. For further reference see ibid., pp. 25-26.
25
David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York: John Wiley
and Sons Publishing Company, 1965, p. 8,
Ibid., p. 8.

systems theory is used in this thesis to study the problematic nature
of Canadian defence policy.
(3) General Systems Theory as a Method of Inquiry
General systems theory is a normative theory with a scientific
base.

27

It performs both an explanatory role as demanded by the pure

sciences and makes predictions based upon an analysis of the
observable facts.

It qualifies as a general theory in that the range

of its subject matter varies from the specific to the all inclusive
while maintaining a high degree of consistency among its component
28
parts.
But, an important distinction must be made between systems
theory as developed by David Easton and general systems theory
as developed by the biologist, Ludwig von Bertalanffy.

Systems theory inf

'a conceptual scheme, a state of mind or general orientation which
serves as a jumping off place for more specialized political research'.

27
Anatol Rapoport "Various Meanings of Theory" in J. Rosenau International Politics and Foreign Policy (3rd ed.), New York: Free Press
Publishing Co., 1961, p. 51, General systems is normative in the sense
that the basic inherent value of survival is superimposed as the 'true
finality' of every open living system. All behaviour is explainable
in terms of this 'true finality'.
28
David Easton, Op cit., p. 7.
29
A. Isaak, Scope and Method of Political Science: An Introduction To
The Methodology of Political Inquiry, Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press
Limited, 1969, p, 220.

29

System theorists like Easton do not base their conceptualization of
'the system' on any established scientific base.
General systems theory on the other hand, is deeply rooted in
the

life

sciences as indicated by von Bertalanffy's extensive
30

observations of nature with his work in biology.

From these obser-

vations in biology, von Bertalanffy found that there are certain
general phenomena that all living systems hold in common with each
other.

The principle governing these phenomena is referred to as

3 1
1 •
isomorphism.

There are approximately twelve recognizable isomorphic characteristics that re-occur in various living organisms
their level of existence or complexity.

regardless of

These twelve isomorphic cha^

racteristics are the following:
(a) Progressive Differentiation - a movement from a more general
and homeogeneous state to a more specialized and heterogeneous
,. -

32

condition of existence.
(b) Progressive Segregation - the system passes from a state of whol
ness to a state whereby elements are arranged into independent
33
causal chains.
30
Von Bertalanffy draws some interesting parallels between certain recurring phenomenon in nature and the view of 'life' as a 'system property'
in his earlier work Modern Theories of Development: An Introduction To
Theoretical Biology translated by J. H. Woodger, London: Oxford University
Press, 1933.
31
L.Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory: Foundations, Development
Applications (revised edition), New York: George Braziller Publishing Co.
1968, p. 81.'
32
Ibid., p. 211.
33
Ibid., p. 68

12.

(c) Progressive Centralization and Progressive Individualization
These two characteristics are combined because neither one
can occur without the other.

Progressive individualization is

only possible if certain dominant parts in the system assume
a dominant role and determine the behaviour of the whole.
. . .
34
This constitutes progressive centralization.
(d) Progressive Mechanization - 'The transition from undifferentiated
wholeness to higher function, made possible by specialization
and a division of labour'.

35

(e) Competition Between Parts - The concept of competition is tied
in closely with another isomorphic characteristic,growth. All
open living systems having varying growth rates, experience
competition for available resources among their own species
as well as within themselves.
(f) Domination of Parts - As the individual component parts of
the system become more sophisticated in structure, they become progressively Individualized because a few select parts
37
tend to dominate the whole.

34
Ibid., p. 73.
35
Ibid., p. 213.
36

Ibid., p. 65,

37
Ibid., p. 73.

(g) Entropy - Negentropy
Entropy represents 'a constant and ongoing tendency within
all open systems to move towards maximum disorder and breakA

-

3 8

down .
Negentropy is the opposing tendency within every open system
that moves the system towards maximum order thus maintaining
the system,
(h) Initial Conditions - Final Outcomes
This isomorphic characteristic applies only to the higher
class of open systems that display a dynamic teleology or
39
directiveness of processes.
Lower level systems with static structures have their final
outcomes determined by their structure. However, the higher
systems in nature's hierarchy with a certain level of awareness have the capability of having their behaviour determined
by foresight of the goal.

Initial conditions may influence

behaviour but final outcomes are determined by the foresight
40
of that final outcome.
(i) Catabolic and Anabolic Rates of Reaction
The concepts of catabolism and anabolism are closely•associated
with the transmission of entropy between the open system and

38

Ibid., p. 39.

39
Ibid., p. 78.

its external and internal environments.

The catabolic rate

of reaction within every open system refers to the capability
of the organism to channel energy into directions that promote
maximum disorder.

External threats to the system increases

catabolism within the system.

The anabolic rate of reaction

counters the catabolic tendency within the system by channelling the available energy in directions that promote every
41
open system's true finality, namely, its continued survival.
(j) System Maintenance
Every open living system is constantly exchanging energy with
its external and internal environments.

Each system is 'self

regulating in the sense of maintaining certain variables and
42
directing the organism towards a desired goal.'

Certain

regulators exist within every open system, be they of a natural
or artificial nature, that move the system toward equilibrium
or a steady state condition.

In chemistry and biology, the

overall process which maintains the material and energy activities at a constant level is referred to as homeostasis.
(k) Growth and Development
It has been established in every scientific and social

41
N. Nyiri, Alternatives To Nuclear Warfare; A Possible Role for Canada in
US/USSR Nuclear Balance, Volume #1, Occasional paper #2, Waterloo, Ontario,
Waterloo Lutheran University, August 1971, pp. 25-26.
42
Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . Op cit., p. 161.
^3Ibid., p. 78.

discipline that growth is 'a component process in development'.
A recognition that these isomorphic characteristics are present
in all systems implies that these systems are purposeful and
goal directed.
(1) Finalities and Equifinalities
Within all living open systems, the parts are arranged in such
a fashion as to indicate a 'certain purpose'.
Even static structures have a directiveness based upon their
structural arrangements.

Sophisticated open systems have a

true finality or purposiveness whereby a system's behaviour
46
is determined by the foresight of the goal being sought.
The true finality of every open system is to ensure its continued

survival although man's symbolic systems may super-

impose new and complex finalities on top of this basic goal
of survival.
Also, all living open systems are capable of reaching the
same final position from different initial conditions at
different times in different ways.

This process is referred

to as equifmality.

44
Refer to L. Von Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of Development . . . .
Op cit., p. 158
45
Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . Op cit., p. 77.
46
Ibid., p. 79.
47
Ibid., p. 79.

All of these isomorphic characteristics are highly interrelated
to each other and can be observed to some appreciable degree in every
open system.

However, the selection of general phenomena that are

held in common by all living organisms by itself is only one more
partial theory, unless these twelve isomorphic characteristics are
placed into proper perspective.
The second principle that sets general systems theory apart from
other scientific theories of inquiry is the concept of organization
48
which gives all life meaning.

No living substance exists in isolation.

Every open system exchanges energy with both its internal and external
environments.

The concept of organization in all organisms specifies

the internal relations of events which constitute the organism as well
as setting up the external relations of that organism to other organisms
49
in its environment.
The existence of organization has created a necessity for hierarchy
to establish 'a division of labour', increase specialization and thus
make growth and development possible.

Every conceivable organism from

the smallest and most simplified to the largest and most complex can
be classified in nature's hierarchy of systems. The following table
(Table 1) indicates the inclusiveness of systems and the way in which
systems have developed in complexity.

Ibid., pp. 47-48.

Table I
Nature's Hierarchy of Systems

50

1/ Static structures
(frameworks)

atoms, molecules and
crystalline structures

final outcomes are determined
only by structure. (There is
no exchange of energy with environment)

2/ Clockworks

clocks, conventional
machines (i.e. pulley,
lever) solar system

each part of system possesses
a certain degree of probability
but final outcomes are still determined by structure

3/ Control mechanisms
(thermostat)

thermostat, servo- increased probability and freemechanisms, homeostatic dom of action for individual
mechanism in organisms
parts but structure still determi'
final outcomes

4/ Open systems

flame, cells and organism in general

First time that initial condition
(structure) do not necessarily de
termine final outcomes

5/ Lower organisms

"plant-like organisms"
increased differentiation of systems (a division of labour)

individual organism (phenotype)
begins to visibly differentiate
itself from its genus type

6/ Animals

information systems de-- individual animal can behave in
velop learning capabili- a manner that differs from its
ty, a small degree of
class of species but seldom does
consciousness exists

7/ Man

symbolism; man has a
past, present and a
future; communication
by language

5/ S o c i o - c u l t u r a l
systems

symbol determined com- - increased knowledge infers inmunities such as nation creased individual freedom
state system and international system

9/ Symbolic systems

Language, Logic, Arts
and the sciences

man's initial conditions do not
determine the final outcome Foresight of goal determines
final outcome

The power to 'abstract' gives man
the freedom to deny the natural
system and its biological restrair
but he cannot reject the natural
system. (To reject the natural
system is to reject organization
which is the essence of life)

The symbolic system unlike the natural system imposes
no restraints on man's ability to act. Therefore, man
is capable of acting either responsibly or irresponsibly
in regards to the demands of the natural system.

50
Table I elaborates on Boulding's informal survey of The Main Levels in the
Hierarchy of Systems in L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . .
Op cit., pp. 28-29

18.

Every system and sub-system in nature's hierarchy interacts with
its particular environment.

As a result of this interaction, there is

a natural competition between systems to acquire the necessary life-giving
forces to ensure survival and maintain growth and development.
"Competition eventually leads to
of the species with the smaller
. . . Every whole is based upon
of its elements and presupposes
tween the parts.

the extermination
growth capacity.
the competition
the struggle be-

This competition between systems results in a type of conflict that
is both entropic and negentropic in effect.

For example, the continued

survival of one organism can be dependent upon the destruction of another
organism of a different species or of the same class of species. This
situation is entropy creating in moving that particular species towards extinction.

However, this same situation is also a positive

growth force that improves the class of species through the process of
natural selection whereby individual organisms of the species become
more adaptive and well integrated through time.
The true finality of every open living system is survival, main52
taining itself and its identity.

In light of this, all defensive

activities occurring within the system are directly supportive of the

Ibid., p. 66
52
A. Rapoport, Conflict in Man-Made Environment, Middlesex, England;
Penguin Books Ltd., 1974, p. 17, The concept of survival infers much more
than the system attempting to attain a steady state condition. Growth
and development are essential components to system survival. The regulating activity attempting to bring all systems to a steady state condition compliments the overall evolution of the organism to a higher level
of existence and complexity. Von Bertalanffy refers to this ongoing movement as one leading to maximum effect with minimum effort. Refer to General
Systems Theory . . . Op cit., p. 75.

19.

system's true finality, survival.
"The defensive mechanism of each system ensures
the survival of each open system which manifests
itself through conflict and destructive behaviour" .""
In man's social systems such as the nation state system, defence is
as primary a function as it is in all natural systems.
However, man,unlike the lower systemSj.has a high degree of self
awareness enabling him to see a past, present and future.
"The more man knows, the more freedom of choice
he has, and the more he knows that he knows, the
more he can make purposive use of his freedom"^s4
Too much freedom of choice can become license unless it is understood in
terms of its relationship to the limitations of nature's hierarchy of
systems.

For example, man can assume that all of his choices are self-

determined 'free' choices rather than choices that are co-determined
with his environment.

Man, with his increased level of knowledge,

mistakenly assumes that the restraints of nature can be controlled,if
not rejected,without serious consequences.

This lack of social restraint

enables man to become one of nature's most excessively violent species.
"Man becomes a killer of his own species because he
has failed to develop social restraints capable of
substituting for the biological wisdom evolved under
natural conditions."56
53
N. Nyiri, Op cit., p. 34.
54
E. Laszlo, Introduction To Systems Philosophy: Toward A Paradigm of Contemporary
Thought, New York: Gordon and Breack Science Publishing Co., 1972, p. 247
55

Ibid., p. 240

56
R. Dubois, "Man's Nature and Social Institutions" in Ashley Montagu, Man
and Aggression, second edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 91.
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While conflict is regulated and controlled within lower ordered
systems by various homeostatic processes, man's potential for conflict
can only be self-regulated.

In nation state systems, the function of

defence is more one of control rather than one of prevention.

The

prevention of conflict between men and nations is difficult to attain
when unlimited demands continue to be made upon the finite natural
system.
The function of all defensive activity in the nation state system
is to control the conflict that occurs within the confines of that
political system itself (i.e. civil war and insurrection) as well as
controlling the conflict that occurs between competing political systems
(i.e. inter-state wars).

The following diagram (Figure A-l) represents

in a conceptual sense how the defence function is realized in a
sequential fashion.
A nation state's defence policy is a rational response by that
nation's political authorities to control the conflict resulting from
the natural competitiveness of open systems, thus maintaining the
political system in its entirety. All questions of defence can be considered
questions of survival.

The real debate in the last few years has been between whether efforts
should be intensified in the areas of conflict prevention or the areas of
conflict management. General systems theory regards conflict springing from
the natural competition between interacting systems as inevitable. This
implies that efforts should be intensified in finding ways to control conflict
within certain acceptable limits. Yet, the difference between conflict management and conflict prevention may only be a semantic one when it is conceivable
to control conflict by working to ameliorate those economic, social and
political conditions that can give rise to conflict between nation states. Future
studies of conflict in its hierarchial context may prove to be highly significant in determining at what systems level efforts of conflict management may
prove to be most effective.
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Defence establishments exist to carry out the task of 'professionalizing
conflict' by conducting the conflict in the most efficient way to attain
rQ

victory.

These defence establishments act as 'homeostatic agents' which

attempt to restore the political system to a steady state condition and
thus maintain the nation state system intact.

It is unreasonable to argue,

as some will, that it is possible to develop a credible defence policy
59
while having no military establishment to implement it.

A. Rapoport, Op cit., p. 212
59
James Eayrs, "Military Policy and Middle Power: The Canadian Experience"
in J. K. Gordon (ed) Canada's Role as a Middle Power, Toronto: Canadian Institute
of International Affairs, 1966, p. 67.
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Defensive activity and more specifically defence policy is a
basic system activity that must be seen in its totality and not fragmented as is so often the case.

Summary
Canada's defence policy has precipitated a series of major
political crises. Most of the research into the problem has been
limited in both the scope and method of inquiry. As of yet, Canada's
defence policy has not been considered in its totality, namely as being
a primary activity serving the interests of national survival.
The use of theory and more specifically general systems theory
may enable one to view defensive activity and defence policy in a
more holistic sense while continuing to employ certain scientific rigour.

General systems theory, being a normative theory with a scien-

tific base can be utilized in this purpose.
There are two ruling principles that provide the focus for
general systems theory.

The first is the realization that certain

common characteristics or tendencies of behaviour re-occur in all
living organisms at various times. The second principle is the concept
of organization.

Every organization, no matter how simple or how com-

plex, exists in a natural hierarchy of systems. As a result of
systems interaction competition occurs between the system parts which
eventually leads to situations of potential conflict.
From an understanding of these two principles combined with competition and conflict between system parts, the defensive activity in
all open systems can be explained in terms of general systems theory.
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As a corollary to this, a nation state's defence policy becomes
a rational response by that nation's political authorities to control
the conflict resulting from the natural competiveness occurring
within the nation state system itself and the natural competiveness
occurring between other nation state systems.
With this theoretical perspective in mind, the following chapter
details the historical development of Canada's defence policy.

CHAPTER II
The Development of Canadian Defence Policy
The Perspective of General Systems Theory:
As stated in the previous chapter, all living open systems are
threatened by anabolic and catabolic rates of reaction which move the
system from a state of undifferentiated wholeness to a differentiation
of parts.

This movement is referred to as progress when one system becomes

a new type of system of a higher order and greater complexity.
Progressive centralization within an open system sets into motion
the forces that promote a gradual transition to progressive individualization.

As certain dominant parts begin to take a leading role in the

system, they dictate certain types of behaviour to the whole, thus
centralizing system activities.

These are important characteristics to

keep in mind in discussing how political systems such as the nation state
system (NSS) and the international system (INS) have developed.
However, man can alter many of the natural processes that occur
within all open living systems.

As stated previously, man lives in a

symbolic universe of his own creation which has given him the power to

L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . Op. cit., p. 70.
In general systems theory, a retrogressive step from a high level of
differentiation to a lower level of differentiation is also considered
as growth over time. It is only in the social disciplines that growth
has been assigned a positive normative value.
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alter but not necessarily control the natural system and its biological
restraints. While all natural open systems move towards progressive
individualization or independence, man can intercede within his social
systems and reverse this natural progression towards individualization.
All natural and man-made social systems strive to reach a high level of
organization and complexity through time.

2

A study of the development of the nation state shows an ongoing
movement in the direction of progressive individualization and
relative self-sufficiency.

Territories and nationalities that were once

colonies or protectorates have either progressed to become sovereign
nation states in their own right or have disappeared by way of being absorbed into a larger, more viable^ political system.
The development of the Canadian nation and more specifically its
defence policy^which is a component part of any nation state system,
reflects this natural progression from a highly centralized state of
dependence upon the whole to a state of increased differentiation and
individual self-sufficiency.
For purposes of this thesis

Canada's defence policy will be broken

down into three distinct periods of development: (1) a period of dependence
(1867-1940); (2) a period of interdependence (1940-1968); and (3) a period
of relative independence (1968-

).

In differentiating between one period

of development and another, certain common characteristics of each period
tend to re-occur to some degree in all three designated periods
of development.

E. Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy . . . . Op cit., p. 252.
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For example, although a particular nation state may appear relatively self-sufficient on one level of existence, that same nation state may
be highly dependent upon another nation state for other resources that
contribute to its continued existence.

In general systems theory

these

periods of development are referred to as equifinal positions or inter's
mediary stages arrived at independently of initial conditions.
(1) A Period of Dependence (1867-1940)
Prior to Confederation

defence was of little concern to the colonial

inhabitants of Upper and Lower Canada with the exception of those few
situations where the threat of invasion from the United States seemed a
possibility.

4

In these situations

Britain was relied on to provide

whatever defence was required.
For economic reasons, Britain wanted to rid itself of the excessive
burdens involved in defending a territory of such immense size as the North
American colonies.

Britain had more pressing concerns in Europe than in

Br. North America.

Furthermore, the colonial governments of Upper and Lower Canad

had been demanding the right of complete self government prior to
Confederation.

British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli found it highly

intolerable that Britain continue to pay for the defence of British North
America when she could not govern her.

Self-government implied self-defence.

L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . Op. cit., p. 132.
R.A. Preston, Canada and Imperial Defence: A Study of the Origins of
The British Commonwealth Defence Organization 1867-1919, Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1967, p. 39. The U.S. Civil War and the Trent
Crisis of 1861 alarmed many colonials as relations between Britain and
the United States appeared to be rapidly deteriorating. At various
times, talk of invading Canada was heard in many high places throughout the United States.
'G.F. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of An Unmilitary
People, third edition, Toronto: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974, p. 240.
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When the British North America Act of 1867 was signed

it granted

Canada dominion status and the responsibility of defending itself.

The

Macdonald government placed considerable emphasis on defence and the
need to build a permanent militia in the early years of Confederation.
Sir George Etienne Cartier, Canada's first Minister of the Militia,
committed the Macdonald government in policy to the building of a permanent
militia.
"No people can lay claim to the title of a nation
if it does not possess a military element - the
means of defence."'
However, stated government policy gave way to more pressing and
immediate concerns than the creation of a permanent militia.

Prime

Minister Macdonald's frantic concern to build the Canadian Pacific
Railway to span the Canadian nation from coast to coast,regardless of
Q

cost, drew attention away from the problems of defence.
It was not until the British Colonial Secretary informed the GovernorGeneral of Canada in early 1870 that all British regular troops would be
withdrawn that defence became an immediate concern to the Macdonald
9
government.
Prior to this, the Militia Act of 1868 had established a
volunteer militia force which was broken down into small bands of volunteers

The British North America Act, 1867, Section 91(7) 'Militia, Military and
Naval service, and Defence.
R.A. Preston, Canadian Defence Policy and the Development of the Canadian
Nation 1867-1917, Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association Publication,
#25 1970, p. 4.
'G„ Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Affairs: The Formative
Years to 1914, Volume I, revised edition, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart
Ltd., 1966, p. 226.
G.F. Stanley, Op. cit., p„ 241.
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who met only on certain special occasions.

It became obvious that the

Macdonald government's volunteer militia had been a token gesture in
the sense that the militia behaved more like a fraternity than a well
trained fighting force.
When the British regulars were withdrawn in 1871, the Canadian
government did very little to fill the void.

It was not until the

establishment of the Royal Military College in 1874 that the government
started to develop a command structure for a virtually leaderless
volunteer militia.

11

The Militia Act of 1883 finally set up a small permanent militia
for reasons that grew out of the necessity of crisis more than from any
understanding of how important defence was to a young nation.

Macdonald's

use of the permanent militia to put down the Riel rebellion of 1885
indicated the importance of having a permanent fighting force that was
both well trained and well equipped.

The citizen soldiers of 1885 had

12
won the day, but only just barely.
While many Canadians exhibited a certain complacency towards
defence matters, the Canadian militia attempted to prepare itself to meet any

10
R. H. Roy, "The Canadian Military Tradition" in H. Massey (ed.) The
Canadian Military: A Profile, Toronto; Copp-Clark Publishing Co.,
1972, p. 27.
G. F. Stanley, Op. cit., p. 244.
12

Ibid., p. 258.
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13
crisis.

Limited government financing combined with outdated weaponry

and poor inconsistent training made their attempts practically futile.
Britain still regarded the Dominion of Canada as a dependent entity.
When Britain committed itself to numerous military adventures abroad,
Canada was expected to contribute to the imperial effort to retain the
British Empire, a common goal for all of Britain s dominions.14 Although
Canada made a significant contribution to the British victory in South
Africa, Prime Minister Laurier served notice to the British in 1900 that
a new and independent Canada would no longer accept the dictates of
imperial centralization.
"I claim for Canada this, that, in future, Canada
shall be at liberty to act or not to act, to
interfere or not to interfere, to do just as she
pleases and that she shall reserve for herself
the right to judge whether or not there is a
cause for her to act. ^-5

13
In the late 1890's Lord Dundonald, the chief commanding officer of the
Canadian militia made several recommendations to improve the quality
of the militia. These recommendations were regarded with skepticism
and distaste by politicians and civilians alike. Prime Minister
Laurier suggested that Dundonald 'not take the militia seriously, for
though It is useful for suppressing internal disturbances, it will
not be required for the defence of the country, as the Monroe Doctrine
protects us from enemy aggression.' For reference Ibid., p. 294.
Also, the Canadian press expressed a type of distaste for Dundonald
and his recommendations for a better militia. An editorial in the
Montreal Herald of 1902 expressed the general view that many Canadians
held regarding war and militarism. "With Europe war is a condition.
With us [Canadians] it is a theory." For details see G. Glazebrook,
Op. cit., p. 229.
14
Ibid., p. 234.
15
G.F. Stanley, Op. cit., p. 288. Prime Minister Laurier was torn by his
commitment to the two solitudes of French Canada and English Canada.
The fact that he was a French Canadian Prime Minister with a natural
distaste for British imperialism was tempered by the realization that
he was a political leader of a predominantly English speaking country
which strongly supported British adventurism.
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The obvious contradiction between this ideal of independence of choice
and Canada's natural dependence on Britain revealed itself as Europe
prepared itself for world war. Britain's Joseph Chamberlain did not
hide the fact that the expense of Canada's defence would be borne, by
Britain.

In return for this protection, he fully expected that Canada

would contribute more in terms of resources and personnel to the
defence of the Empire.

16

At the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909, Britain advocated the
creation of a common defence scheme between all dominions.

This would

involve the military standardization of all dominions in terms of policy
guidelines set down by Britain:
"There would be only one school of study, one
curriculum and one teacher; there might be
several schoolhouses but the lessons taught in
each would be identical." 17
For Canada, this meant a form of regression to a state of complete dependence.
since

It seemed that many of the concessions acquired from Britain

Confederation

had been lost by Canada's acceptance of this

defensive arrangement.
In general systems terminology, a movement towards progressive
individualization is often countered by an equivalent movement towards
increased centralization and undifferentiated wholeness.

18

When Britain declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914, Canada
had only the freedom 'to determine the extent and nature of her contribution
'19
to war and not the right to proclaim neutrality.

In battle, the British

-i r

G. Glazebrook, Op. cit., p. 238.
G. F. Stanley, Op. cit., p. 304.
18
L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . pp cit., p. 71.
19
y
G. F. Stanley, Op. cit., p. 310.
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military command lumped Canadian soldiers together with its own regulars.
Canadian political leaders protested against this lack of differentiation
and insisted that Canadian soldiers be viewed as serving the interests
of Canada abroad.

For if the British were to recognize the independent

status of the Canadian soldier then this could amount to a de facto
20
recognition of Canada's independence.

Gradually, Canada was beginning

to exercise more and more freedom within the confines of this highly
centralized imperial defence arrangement.
At the end of World War I, Canadian defence policy encountered a
significant degree of governmental complacency.

When the crisis of war

subsided and peace returned, the Canadian government neglected defence
policy again and allowed the wartime effectiveness of the military to
21
deteriorate in the areas of weapons modernization and personnel morale.
Consequently, Canadian defence policy had become crisis oriented in that
it only received day to day consideration only during extended periods
of crisis.
In the general systems context, a form of natural dependency can
develop for those parts that fall behind their competitors.

If a nation's

defence policy is crisis oriented and merely reactive in its responses to
actions that are initiated by others, then that nation can exercise very
little control in crisis situations. More specifically, when a nation's
defence policy becomes merely a stimulus-response syndrome, the prediction
of conflict becomes haphazard and its control virtually non-existent.
After the conclusion of World War I, the Canadian government was
desirous of striking up a new and more autonomous relationship with

Ibid„, p. 315.
Ibid., p. 340.
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Britain.

At the 1926 Imperial Conference, Canada was granted certain

important concessions from Britain.

The most important being Britain's

agreement that Canada would no longer be automatically committed to any
future European war.

Canada would be a signatory to any major treaty5

including a declaration of war.

22

Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, like his predecessors, had
a strong sense of mistrust of European political affairs.

When the

possibility arose for Canada to be elected as a non-permanent member of
the Council of the League of Nations, King'was hesitant in involving
23
Canada in European politics.

When the Italian army invaded Ethiopia

in 1935, the King government supported the use of sanctions by the League
of Nations in principle but King refused to adopt any military or economic
sanctions against Italy in the fear of committing Canada to some future
European war.
For many years, Prime Minister King was able to steer a course down
the middle of the road between isolationism in fact and collective
security in principle.
in governmental policy.

Canada's defence policy reflected this ambiguity
During the depression years, the Canadian military

establishment incurred serious cutbacks in both its financing and
personnel.

25

Attempts to bolster the defence budget in the years prior

22
H.B. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King 1924-1932: The Lonely Heights
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970, p. 188.
23

Ibid., p. 194.

24
F. Soward, J. Parkinson, N. MacKenzie, T. MacDermot, Canada in World
Affairs: The Pre-War Years, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1941, p. 25.
25
G.F. Stanley, Op. cit., p. 343.
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to 1937 met with stiff opposition.
However, the increasing prospects of war in Europe, combined with
a proposal by Major-General A. McNaughton to streamline the Canadian
militia, loosened the purse-strings of the King government.
A further development was occuring within the confines of the
Canadian defence establishment.

The defence establishment was exhibit-

ing aspects of growth and development from within as it moved from a
general state of undifferentiated wholeness to a differentiation of the
parts and 'a division of labour.'
The 1936 re-organization of the Canadian militia by Major-General
McNaughton recommended the creation of a Canadian Defence Committee
with the function of co-ordinating the militia's activities with those
of other government departments.

27

This development can be accounted for

in general systems theory:
"If the system (i.e. defence establishment) is
split up into individual causal chains, these
go on independently. Increasing mechanization
means increasing determination of elements
to functions only dependent on themselves and
consequent loss of regularity which rests in
the system as a whole, owing to the interrelations present."28
Slowly, Canada's defence policy was beginning to develop both form
and substance.

Its defence policy was no longer to be paraphrased as

the defence of the British Empire.

26
Ibid., p. 346.
27
Ibid., p. 347.
78

L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . Op. cit., p. 69.
The development of Canada's defence establishment will be discussed
in greater detail in the following chapter.
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(2) A Period of Interdependence (1940-1968)
A differentiation between the period of dependence (1867-1940) and
the period of interdependence (1940-1968) is important to understand
both for their distinct differences and similarities.

For purposes of

this thesis, the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940 is selected as the initial
take-off point for the period of interdependence by which Canada agreed
to allow the United States and Britain the use of Canadian soil for
defensive activities relating to their war efforts.

29

All parties to this agreement fully realized that this concession
was not merely a temporary one, but rather a long-term commitment by
Canada for the defence of North America.

The Ogdensburg Agreement was

the formal acceptance of the principle of North American defence which
had been worked out two years prior to the Agreement itself.
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King met at Kingston,
Ontario in 1938 to lay the foundation for this mutual commitmenti
President Roosevelt assured Canada that the United States would not
'stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other
empire.'

30

Prime Minister King's counter-endorsement of Canada's

commitment to the defence of the United States was far more explicit,
leaving little room for interpretation:

29
J.S. Pemberton (ed.) "Ogdensburg, Hyde Park -- and After" in Behind
The Headlines (April, 1941), p. 3.
30
R.M. Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: Two Years of War (1939-1941)
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 237. Many observers at
the time regarded the President's guarantee as nothing more than
an extension of the Monroe doctrine.
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"Canada would regard it as her duty to see that,
at our own instance, our country is made as
immune from attack or possible invasion as we
can reasonably be expected to make it, and that,
should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces
should not be able to pursue their way, either
by land, sea or air to the United States across
Canadian territory."31
The significant differences in these two official statements on
a common problem, the defence of North America, indicated the type of
relationship these nations had with each other.

President Roosevelt

spoke in generalities which allowed him the freedom to react to any
crisis in terms of whether or not it was in the national interest of the
United States.

Prime Minister King, on the other hand, reflecting

Canada's growing dependence on American military superiority, made a blanket
commitment to intervene to stop any threat to North American security.
More specifically, every threat against North America was to be perceived
as a threat against Canada.

In the case of the Americans, there was some

element of choice involved in their decision of whether or not to act.
Although on the surface the declaratory policies coming out of Canada
and the United States -emphasized interdependence and mutuality in problems
of continental defence, in reality there was clear cut substantive
evidence of a growing dependency by Canada on the U.S.
As the war in Europe dragged on, Canada found it self in cthe position
of paying off Britain's growing war deficit by borrowing money from the
United States.

This situation increased Canada's national debt and created
32

an unhealthy balance of trade deficit with its neighbour to the south.

G.F. Stanley, Op. cit., p. 407.
R. Cuff, J. Granatstein, Canadian American Relations in Wartime: From
the Great War to the Cold War, Toronto: Hakkert Publishing Co., 1975,
p. 74.
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The 1941 Hyde Park Agreement strengthened this dependency relationship by broadening the scope of continental defence to include as well
33
'the economic defence of the Western Hemisphere.'

Although the Hyde

Park Agreement held out some promise for the development of a defence
production industry in Canada, in the long run the agreement served to
make Canada more dependent on United States technology.
Since the United States had both the financial and technological
base to support new weapons development on a massive scale, Canada found
itself dependent on the U.S. for the benefits of that technology.
" . . . despite the spirit of the Declaration
[Hyde Park] Canada remained dependent on the
U.S. for new weapons, and for all intents and
purposes, the development of a long range defence
policy depends on weapons-systems production at
home."34
As discussed in the previous section on Canada's early dependency
on Britain prior to World War I, military standardization by one dominant
part over the other parts of the system tends to serve the interests of
the whole system often at the expense of the individual parts that seek
increased independence.

While Canada perceived that a mutual partner-

ship with the United States in certain areas would grant her more freedom ..
and independence of action, increased interdependence had restored a new
type of dependence instead.
During World War II, the United States government increasingly
informed rather than consulted Canada when it came to matters of North

The Right Honourable William Lyon Mackenzie King, House of Commons
Debates, April 28, 1949, p. 2289.
N. Nyiri, Alternatives to Nuclear Warfare: A Possible Role for Canada
in US/USSR Nuclear Balance, Waterloo: Waterloo Lutheran University 1972,
Volume II, Occasional Paper #2, p. 416.

37,
35
American defence.

While the Canadian government talked of mutuality and

equal partnership, the United States did not respond as an equal partner
but rather

acted as a dominant part of the whole system.
"The sum total of all these developments was
that Canada, in fact if not in theory ceased
to be the equal partner in continental defence
envisaged in 1938 and 1940." 3 6

In an attempt to reverse this strong movement towards a centralized
form of regional, defence, the Canadian government looked toward Europe as
a possible counterweight to offset a growing dependency on the United
States.

The major threat to Canada after World War II was the growing

possibility of a future nuclear war in Europe between the allied forces
and the Soviet Union.

In any nuclear exchange, Canadian airspace would

be an inevitable battleground with a certain number of Soviet atomic
37
bombs falling on Canadian soil.
In response to this threat, the Canadian government felt that
Canada could -best be defended as far away from her native shores as

>^
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possible by involving herself in collective defence arrangements abroad.

This became the basis for the argument of Europe being Canada s first line
of defence.

35
G.F. Stanley, Op. ci t., p. 409. The United States would often bypass
the Canadian government and consult Britain on matters of North
American defence. The defence of Newfoundland and Greenland and the
installation of a destroyer base on Canadian soil were two examples of
this tendency by the United States to inform Canada after the decisions
had been made.
36

Ibid., p. 415.

37
General Charles Foulkes, Canadian Chief of Staff speaking in 1948 as
quoted in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacekeeping and Deterrence
Volume III, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 100.
o o

The Honourable Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, House of
Commons Debates, Friday, March 27, 1953, p. 3339.

The creation of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945
complemented the beliefs of many Canadian politicians that if enough
collective security pacts existed 'to girdle the globe' then the prospect
39
for world peace would be enhanced.

However, collective security admin-

istered through such international bodies as the United Nations by itself
proved to be insufficient.

The fall of Czechoslovakia to the Communists

on February 25, 1948, indicated to the major Western powers that an
European defensive alliance capable of using force would be needed to
halt Soviet aggression.
As a result, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) grew
out of the belief that collective self defence on a regional basis would
fill those gaps the United Nations could not fill.

In the bipolar world

of the nineteen-fifties, Canada attempted to encourage the larger superpowers to commit themselves to various multilateral treaties and agreements.

If enough structural organizations existed to compel the larger

superpowers to resolve their differences through negotiation, the
possibility of conflict occurring would be lessened.
In a systems context, Canada's role was one of 'systems modulation'
There were two possible options that Canada could pursue simultaneously
in its role as systems modulator.
Option 1: Moderate the views and behaviour of the only superpower actor
to which Canada had some effective measure of access
: the United States.
39
The Honourable L.B. Pearson, "Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance" i
Foreign Affairs, Volume XXVII (April 1949), p. 374.
40
Denis Stairs, "The Foreign Policy of Canada" in J. Rosenau, K. Thompson
and G. Boyd (eds.) World Politics: An Introduction, New York: Free Pres
Publishers, 1976, p. 194.
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Option 2: Exercise a constraining influence on such conflicts as might
break out in peripheral parts of the global system, with a
view to preventing them from escalating to the great power
level.
It was in the context of these two foreign policy options that Canada's
defence policy was expected to operate in the late fifties and early
sixties.
But, carrying out these options meant that the majority of Canadian
military personnel would be committed to crisis situations abroad over
which they had no actual control.
"This amounted in essence to a claim \that
overall decisions relating to military
requirements, were being made elsewhere,
and that Canada was performing--faithfully-an externally assigned role."^
This fact became more obvious with the controversy surrounding the NORAD
debate in 1957.

The conflict between foreign policy objectives and the

fulfillment of basic defensive obligations required in Canada's commitment to collective security had shown the inherent contradictions in
government policy.

The previous position that Canada's best line of

defence should be established as far away from Canadian shores as
possible offered little for the immediate defence of Canada.

43

The sound military logic of NORAD was lost in the political
confusion and the semantic problems created by the Diefenbaker government
44
and the opposition political parties.

41

In an attempt to disguise Canada s

Ibid., p. 194.

42
Denis Stairs, "The Military as an Instrument . . . . Op. cit., p. 101.
Refer to Brooke Claxton, op. cit., p. 3339.
44

J. McLin, 0p„ cit., p. 56„

natural dependency on the United States in matters of defence, the
Canadian government argued that NORAD was an 'integrated part' of the
NATO Alliance.

45

The long delay in accepting NORAD accomplished very little in granting Canada a more credible voice in North American defence strategy.

The

Canadian government's concern for sovereignty and independence served only t
increase Canadian dependence on the American deterrent capability.
While Canada reaffirmed
collective security,

a commitment to the principle of

it was unwilling to be associated with any existing

organization or weapons system that backed up that collective security
principle.

The nuclear weapons debate of the late fifties and early

sixties was one more indication of this very point.

Improved develop-

ments in strategic nuclear weapons placed a great strain on the Canadian
government to go with the trend or risk the consequences of rejecting new
technology.

If Canada were to accept strategic nuclear weapons then this

would mean that Canada had gone 'nuclear'.

This course of action would have

represented going back on an earlier general commitment made after World
War II that Canada would not become a nuclear power.
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But, a total rejection of nuclear weapons would amount to an

Ibid., p. 54. This position was refuted by both the American authorities and Secretary-General of NATO, Paul-Henri Spaak, who regarded
NORAD strictly as a bilateral military agreement.
46
Canada, Department of National Defence White Paper on Defence (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1964), p. 7. The Canadian position not to become'a
nuclear power', was shrouded in contradiction. For years, successive
Canadian governments continued to sell uranium to the United States
for military and non-military purposes. Also, the Canadian government
had granted U.S. authorities permission to fly their nuclear air
carriers into Canadian airspace. For more details see J. McLin,
Op. cit. , p. 128.

abdication of Canada's responsibility for sharing in continental defence
with the United States and living up to its defensive obligations in
NATO.

There was no escape from the reality that Canada would have to

continue to play its part in the NATO/NORAD alliances which meant placing
tactical nuclear weapons in Canadian hands.
control.

The real issue was one of

Should Canada have exclusive control over any nuclear weapons

emplaced on Canadian territory or provided for its military forces
stationed in Europe?

47

Without resolving the moral issue of whether or not Canada should
have nuclear weapons, the Diefenbaker government acquired the necessary
delivery systems for such nuclear weapons.

Bomarc missiles were emplaced

on Canadian soil and made operational in March 1962.
48
with nuclear warheads until early 1964.

They were not armed

Honest John rockets were

provided for the Canadian brigade in NATO in early 1962 but no nuclear
/n

warheads were installed on them until the middle of 1964.
For a period of approximately two years from the middle of 1962
to early 1964, the Canadian armed forces had only conventional capabiliti
to meet any possible nuclear threat.

It was factually impossible for

Canada's armed forces to be provided with nuclear weapons 'if and when
they were required' in an emergency situation as the Canadian government

47
Ibid., p. 123.
48
Ibid., p. 132.
49
Ibid., p. 132.
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During the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 when the Soviet
Union threatened to penetrate the continental defence of North America,
Canada was in a situation of total dependence on the nuclear
deterrence capability of the United States to defend Canada against
nuclear attack.
As a result of this crisis situation, the new Canadian government
accepted Canada's obligation to NATO and NORAD by providing its armed
forces with the necessary tactical nuclear weapons. A forced acceptance
of one's responsibilities had proven to be a bitter pill to swallow.
Canadian political authorities were eager to look for new roles and
responsibilities that could be effectively performed without stirring up
unwanted controversy.
It was the Canadian government's desire that the whole basis of
defence policy be reexamined with special reference being made
to finding 'more realistic and effective roles' for Canada to play in
the NATO/NORAD Alliance systems.

The Pearson government hoped that

Canadian industry would be capable of supplying the needs of its defence
policy commitments.

52
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The Right Honourable John Diefenbaker, House of Commons Debates,
January 18, 1969, #1, p. 73. Prime Minister Diefenbaker argued that
it was possible for Canada's armed forces to receive nuclear weapons
from the United States within half an hour. This was not possible
as Canada had no agreement with the United States for such an
exchange.
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The Right Honourable L.B. Pearson, Globe and Mail, January 14, 1963,
p. 11.
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The Right Honourable L.B. Pearson, House of Commons Debates 1962-63,
Vol. Ill, p. 3124.
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The 1964 White Paper on Defence represented the embodiment of these
h o p e s f o r a more m e a n i n g f u l

defence p o l i c e .

Hhe WhiJ-p P a p p r rprniumpndpH

shifting the locus of Canada's defence policy away from the bilateral
concerns of North American defence to the broader and more universal
concerns of collective security in Europe and the United Nations,
This emphasis on multilateralism and the downplaying of Canada's natural
dependency on the United States reaffirmed the persistent Canadian
54
belief in mutual deterrence through collective security.
The deemphasizing of the defence of Canada by means of bilateral agreements
between Canada and the United States represented a marked departure from
55 *r"~~
previous defence White Papers, /v^-—'
Also, the White Paper proposed a complete reorganization of the
military establishment with the hope of making it more flexible and
versatile In performing its assigned tasks.

Flexibility was a key term

that repeatedly appeared in the White Paper.
"The goal of flexibility was dictated by the
view that a country of Canada's size and resources
could no longer afford to invest in expensive
weapons systems that were useful only for one
mission which changing strategic or political
conditions might render inappropriate."56

53
Canada, Department of National Defence White Paper on Defence
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964), p. 4.
54
N. Nyiri, Alternatives to Nuclear Warfare . . . . Vol. #2, p. 106.
Canada's various White Papers on Defence spanning the years 1949 to
1959 repeatedly established that the defence of Canada was the
primary objective of her defence policy. The 1964 White Paper on
Defence shifted this objective to a tertiary position in terms of
priority.
J. McLin, Op. cit., p. 200.

What the Canadian government was looking for was a multipurpose
weapon that would perform more than one role with limited expense. For
example, a substitute was sought for the CF-104 Starfighter, a tactical
support aircraft which could perform both ground-to-air support
and

fly surveillance and reconnaisance missions.

However, multi-

purpose weapons systems are a rare commodity in an age of highly
sophisticated weapons technology that develops weapons systems for
specific needs.
The Pearson government further handicapped itself in its search
for weapons flexibility by setting up an arbitrary budget figure for upcoming defence expenditures and then manipulated

Canada's defence

requirements so that they fell in line with that arbitrary figure.

This

frugal approach to defence spending was criticized because no preliminary
analysis on objectives was attempted prior to setting down any
1, 1

-
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budgetary figures.
As a result, Canada's new-look armed forces were expected to
carry out existing responsibilities8 as well as assuming the
challenging demands of international peacekeepingjWith the same amount
of money.

As could be expected, the functional utility of Canada's

armed forces was taxed to the limit.
As a result, the Canadian defence establishment became less concerned wi
military problems than with finding ways to economize in the performance
of its responsibilities.

57

Although economy in government spending is a

Ibid., p. 200.

cQ

For further details refer to The Special Committee on Defence, House
of Commons, Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer), Thursday May 28, 1964, p. 43.
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desirable goal, it is 'essentially extraneous to the immediate pursuit of
Canada's role in world affairs.'

59

A certain number of basic limitations that resisted the
successful implementation of those policy changes recommended in the
1964 White Paper, prevailed.

The first and most important limitation was the

recognition that Canada had long established defence commitments to the
NATO and NORAD Alliances that had to be respected. Although Canada was not
the dominant part of these alliance systems it was expected 'to pull its
own weight.
Furthermore, the Canadian government's desire to utilize Canada's
industrial resources to fulfil its defence policy requirements was severely
handicapped by the government's support of competitive bidding.

Canadian

industry, lacking the economic and technological base to be competitive,
was unable to match her American counterpart in weapons cost and delivery
A

<-

6 1

dates.
Canada's defence production industry required some form of government protection before it could hope to compete with the more competitive
defence production industries in the United States.

The cancellation of

the Avro-Arrow defence project in early 1959 indicated how dependent
Canadian defence policy was on American weapons systems.

The

Canadian government argued for the principle of competitive bidding on
59
Denis Stairs, "The Military as an Instrument . . . Op. cit., p. 107.
&n

The Right Honourable John Diefenbaker, S t a t e m e n t s and Speeches # 6 3 / 6 ,
January 25, 1963, p. 3.
61
J . McLin, Op. c i t . , p. 216.
For more details on the Avro-Arrow Project see R. Reford "Making Defence
Policy in Canada" Op. cit., pp. 12-14 inclusive.
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the pretext of wanting to obtain good value for every defence dollar
spent.

63
As a result, Canadian defence buying policy took on the appearance

of being highly inconsistent in terms of obtaining value.

64

While certain

aspects of Canada's defence production industry were protected by the
government, other aspects of that same industry (i.e. Canada's aircraft
industry) were given little or no protection whatsoever.

Often certain

barter type arrangements were made with other NATO member nations for the
purchase of weapons systems that proved unsuitable for Canada's needs.
The cumulative effect of these various decisions during the midsixties was to increase Canada's dependency on the United States for
6 6

A f

defence.
Although the 1964 White Paper on Defence promised new responsibilities
and a significant change in direction, very little had in fact changed
from the fifties and early sixties.

Canada's defence policy continued

to be understood and justified in terms

of alliance commitments to

NATO and NORAD.
(3) A Period of Relative Independence (1968 -

).

The concept of 'independence' as used here in the context of Canada's
defence policy must be interpreted with a certain amount of caution.

63

By

xhe
Honourable C M . Drury, Minister of Industry, House of Commons
Debates, February 7, 1966, pp. 802-803.

"^"Gideon Rosenbluth, The Canadian Economy and Disarmament, Toronto:
Macmillan of Canada Ltd., 1967, p. 40.
The purchase of Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV's) for Canada's NATO
forces in 1966 is one case in point of a weapon that was unsuited for
Canadian needs. The AFV's proved to be too heavy for airlifting and
their steel tracks tore up roads and terrain alike. For more details
see J. Sheltus, Op. cit., p. 12.
66
Gideon Rosenbluth, Op. cit., p. 41.

no means can independence be thought of in absolute terms.
"No nation can enjoy the degree of independence
in decision which existed in earlier times.
Every major decision has become immensely more
complicated by the considerations which new
military technology, science, economics and
humanitarian obligations present to the
governments concerned. The great powers have
more complex considerations to weigh but the
lesser powers cannot expect to have much freedom of choice either. Independence in foreign
affairs cannot have quite the same meaning as
in other fields."67
In general systems theory, a degree of 'independence' is possible
for every system part only if it remains an integral part of the system.
More specifically, the degree of independence attained by a system part
is proportionate to the level of interdependence enforced within the
6 8
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whole system.
When considering a possible period of independence in Canadian
defence policy,

it is relative to how interdependent

Canada was in terms of the whole international system.

The 1964 White

Paper on defence attempted to set down new roles and responsibilities
that Canada's armed forces could perform aside from her usual alliance
contributions.
Peacekeeping was the ideal vehicle through which Canada could make
an important individual contribution to international peace and security
69
as well as integrating both her defence policy and her foreign policy.
However, peacekeeping began to lose its appeal when UNEF was ordered out

The
Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of External Affairs,
Statements and Speeches, January 31, 1966.
E. Laszlo, Introduction to System Philosophy . . . . Op. cit., p. 239.
A.M. Taylor, D. Cox and J. Granatstein, Peacekeeping: International
Challenge and Canadian Response, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968, pp. 49-51.
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by the Egyptians in 1967.
The year 1968 represented a significant year in the continuing
evolution of both Canada's defence and foreign policies.
Canadians had elected a new Prime Minister with a different perspective
on the role that Canada should play in world affairs.

Prime Minister

Trudeau's concerns were less directed towards the international
community than they were towards an economically viable Canadian society.
In the Prime Minister's opinion this was the best contribution that
Canada could make to the international community.
The Trudeau government promised a more realistic appraisal of
Canada's foreign and defence policies when it announced its foreign
71
policy review in early 1968.

Prime Minister Trudeau expressed certain

personal preferences regarding Canada's alliance contributions to both
NATO and NORAD.

It was the view of the new government that Canada had

overcommitted herself to NATO on the Pearsonian assumption that Europe
was Canada's first JLine of defence.

This European commitment had led to

the unfavourable situation of NATO dictating Canadian foreign policy.

72

Prime Minister Trudeau personally believed that it was NORAD and not
NATO that held the key to Canada's defence policy.

73

On the 3rd of April, 1969, Prime Minister Trudeau announced the
phased reduction of Canadian armed personnel in her NATO contingent in
Europe.

74

While Canadian forces in NATO were cut back by approximately

Bruce Thordarson, Op. cit., p. 70.
The Right Honourable Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Statements and Speeches,
#68/17 May 29, 1968.
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John Holmes, Canada: A Middle Aged Power, Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart Publishing Co., 1976, p. 9.
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B. Thordarson, Op. cit., pp. 72-73.
74
Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, April 3, 1969.
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50 percent, there were very few cutbacks made in its NORAD
contribution.

The shift in Canada's defensive commitments from Europe

to North America indicated the Trudeau government's desire to have a
greater input in the determination of continental defence.

75

However while these developments were occurring in Ottawa, certain
other related developments were unfolding in Washington that had an
important bearing on North American defence strategy and, more specifically, Canada's defence policy.

In the latter part of the sixties, an

explosion in weapons technology occurred which placed all questions of
military strategy open to debate.

The most significant technological

breakthroughs in weapons development came in those areas that related
directly to improving a nation's defensive capability.

Both the United

States and Soviet Union had made significant advances in developing
Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence (AEMD) systems that could be deployed
exclusive!*^ on home soil.
As a result of this technological development, the basis of
continental defence became subject to question.

Canada had become less

important in American plans to defend the United States, the continent
,
J
andj the
deten-ent.

7 6

Canadian politicians and the military alike were fully aware that
these new developments could force hard decisions
like Canada.

on

smaller'nations

If the United States decided to install either the Sentinel

or Safeguard ABMD systems on American soil, then that would tend to
fragment the defence of North America.'
75
B. Thordarson, Op. cit., p. 73.
John Holmes, "Canada and The United States: Political and Security
Issues" in Behind The Headlines, Vol. XXIX, #1-2 (March, 1970), p. 2.
77
See Dr. G.R. Lindsey, Standing Committee on External Affairs and
National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Wednesday
May 21, 1969 and Thursday, May 22, 1969.
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Although the United States government decided to postpone the full
scale implementation of the ABMD system due to its exorbitant cost,
individual ABMD systems (Safeguard) were installed around some of the
larger American cities.

The significance of the whole ABMD issue centered

not in the weapon itself but rather it indicated the kind of changes

that

defensive weapons like ABMD could bring about, affecting future
military strategy.
In the past, weapons technology had favoured the development of
general all-purpose offensive weapons, such as the hydrogen bomb, which
has been used in an indiscriminate manner.

In recent years,

weapons development has shifted away from indiscriminate offensive
weapons systems to the more discriminating tactical offensive weapons as
well as active and passive defence measures.

78

These technological developments in weapons systems created a new
attitude of 'arbitrariness' in Washington toward

its military allies.

For many years, United States authorities had continued to warn its allies
that if they did not contribute more to alliance defence then the United
States would not continue to bankrupt

itself

for their benefit.

79

This arbitrary attitude in Washington towards America" s allies was
reflected by both the United States Congress and the Nixon administration
alike.

When Senator Fulbright, then chairman of the highly prestigious

Foreign Relations Committee, was asked if the Canadian government had been

78
Weapons technology and how it influences Canada's defence policy will
be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.
79
For more details on the growing expense of alliance defence for the
Americans, refer to Chapters One and Four of Bruce Russett's What
Price Vigilance?: The Burdens of National Defence, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1970, pp 1-22, pp. 91-123 respectively.

'informed' of the installation of the ABM Safeguard on the U.S. border,
his response that Canadians either 'like it or lump it' was indicative
80
of this hardening in attitudes.
The Nixon administration although more tactful than certain members
of Congress, encouraged Canada to assume more 'autonomous and independent
policies' for each nation must decide the requirements of its own
security.

This policy became popularly known as the Nixon Doctrine.

Canada was being forewarned that weapons technology had brought about
certain changes in strategic conditions.

Canadian territory was not as

imperative to 'continental defence' efforts as it had been in the past.
Also, the Nixon Doctrine emphasized that Canada become more self
reliant in economic matters as well as in matters of security.

On

August 15, 1971, the United States levied a 10 percent surcharge on all
Canadian exports entering the United States.

This unilateral action

forced the Canadian government to reexamine Canada's position as an
industrial and trading nation.
The conclusions drawn from that reexamination basically reaffirmed
the geographical fact that Canada was, for better or worse, a North
American nation whose destiny lay with the United States and the
on

Senator Fulbright as quoted in J. Holmes, Canada: A middle Aged Power,
Op. cit. , p. 15.
81
President Richard Nixon, as quoted in the article "Canada-U.S. Relations:
Options for the Future" in International Perspectives (Ottawa: Department
of External Affairs, Autumn 1972), p. 7.
09

Refer back to R. Sutherland's argument in 1962 that geography
'strategically committed' United States to the defence of Canada.
Geography is not as important a factor as it was in 1962.
The
Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Minister of External Affairs,
Statements and Speeches #71/23, September 21, 1971.
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Atlantic Community.

84

What is significant in the recognition of this basic fact is that
the Trudeau government fully realized that Canadian independence to any
appreciable degree could only be attained through increased interdependence.
" . . . our goal should be to exercise our
national independence, political and economic
alike, as responsible parts of a whole that
can be greater than its parts, where, each
pursues his own interests and aspirations
with full respect for the interests and
aspirations of others . . . . "°5
To acquire sufficient independence of action within the confines of
a highly interdependent relationship is a problem common to all living
systems.

A corresponding desire by the parts for increased individual-

ization is countered by the whole system's tendency to increase, centralization and thus make the natural dependency of the parts to the whole
even greater.
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Under these changing conditions the Trudeau government tabled its
1971 White Paper on Defence - Defence in the 70's.

The White Paper

represented a significant shift away from the general concerns of alliance
defence to the more specific concerns of defending Canadian territory.
The prevention of nuclear war through mutual deterrence remained the major
objective of Canada's defence policy as it had in previous White Papers.
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Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1964, p. 63.
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Op. cit., p. 73.
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Queen's Printer, August 1971).
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However, there was a distinct shift in emphasis given to those priorities
by which that mutual deterrence objective could be attained.

The four

major priorities to be carried out by Canada's armed forces were the
following:

(a) Surveillance of Canadian Territory and Coastline, i.e.
Protection of Canadian sovereignty;
(b) Defence of North America in cooperation with the United States;
(c) The fulfillment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed
upon;
(d) The performance of such international peacekeeping roles
as we may from time to time assume.

88

Unlike the 1964 White Paper on Defence, Defence in the 70's related
explicitly to Canada's natloBaJr-irtfrereg-ts.

Such terms as 'sovereignty

and independence', 'economic well being', 'aid to the civil power' and
'national development' appeared frequently throughout the text of the
Defence White Paper.
While some viewed the 1971 Defence White Paper as a form of
'retrenchment', it would be more precise to regard the White Paper as an
attempt to rationalize existing

defence roles with the prospect of

improving t n e capability to perform Canadian defined functions and
89
assist in protecting the U.S. deterrent at the same time.

The phased

reduction of Canadian armed personnel in NATO as well as the dropping

Ibid., p. 16.
89
Melvin Conant, "A Perspective on Defence: The Canada-United States
Compact" in Behind The Headlines , Vol. XXXIII, #4, Sept., 1974, p. 24.
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of its NATO nuclear strike role seemed to indicate Canada's abandonment of
90
Europe as an essential counterweight to the United States.
However, for most western nations, defence policy decisions are
91
essentially economic decisions.

As the Trudeau government continued

to reassess its defence policy, it was becoming obvious that the economics
of defending Canada would ultimately determine the strength of the
Trudeau government's commitment to change.

The Trudeau government, like

its predecessor, wanted to provide the best means of defence for the least
amount of money.

The emphasis in the 1971 Defence White Paper was on

developing a highly mobile and well-equipped military force to carry out
92
these new roles.
Much of the existing military equipment proved unsuitable for many of the new roles being proposed in the Defence White
93
Paper.
J|>*^ The significance of the 1971 White Paper on Defence in comparison
to other Defence White Papers is the recognition that defence begins at
94
home.
While previous Defence. White Papers emphasized Canada's international commitments before its national responsibilities, the 1971
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Toronto: Clarke, Irwin Publishing Company, 1972, p. 8.
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The Right Honourable Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada,
Statements and Speeches, 69/7 April 3, 1969, p. 1. This desire for
acquiring multipurpose weapons is quite similar to the Pearson
government's search for multipurpose weapons in 1964.
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For example, the DDH-280 helicopter-destroyer by itself without
ground-to-air support, would prove highly ineffectual in performing
a coastal surveillance function. Also, the outdated but reliable
Argus long range patrol aircraft needed to be replaced by a faster
prototype that could cover greater distances in shorter periods of
time. For details see Colin Gray, Op. cit., pp. 134-135.
94
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Defence White Paper reversed this alignment and reordered Canada's
defence commitments by building from the centre core to the outside
rather than building from the outside into the centre core.

Europe would

no longer be considered as Canada's first line of defence.
As a result, NORAD assumed new importance in Canadian defence policy
because it enabled Canada's armed forces to carry out the surveillance
of Canadian territories and continue its detection role in NORAD thereby
95
protecting the U.S. deterrent.

Although NATO seemed to be downplayed

in favour of the NORAD Alliance, the Trudeau government continued to
value its NATO membership for political and economic reasons rather than
military ones.
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The question of Canadian independence in respect to continuing its
commitment to the NATO/NORAD Alliance systems has proven to be both
superficial and misleading when it is discussed in a general systems
context.

Since Canada is not a dominant part in the international system

like the United States or the Soviet Union, she must adapt to changes in
the external environment that are not of her own choosing.
However, this situation of natural dependency upon the actions of
the superpowers differs from the previous periods of dependence and
interdependence in Canada's history.
" . . . Canadian authorities are now less preoccupied than before with the Pearsonian problem of
stable 'systems maintenance' per se, and more
Canadian interests from system interactions . . ,
they are less concerned with contributing to the
conditions of peaceful diplomatic exchange than
with the substance of the exchange itself.""7
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Canadian decision makers no longer perceive Canada's role as being
that of a "system maintainer" but rather visualize themselves only as one
more actor within the international system with specific national
interests to protect.
From this perception comes the realization that Canadian
'independence' to any degree can only be found in already existing interdependent relationships such as the NATO/NORAD Alliances.

Canadian

defence critic John McLin argues that a nation can only have as much
influence upon the structure and the military and political policies of
any alliance as it is willing to contribute to the alliance militarily.
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It may seem ironic, but Canada's continued participation in the NATO/NORAD
Alliance systems may be the one commitment that keeps it from being force
into a greater dependency upon the United States.
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Furthermore, there have been other recent developments in the
international system that would seem to indicate increased Canadian
reliance on strengthening this relationship with the United States.

The

multipolarity prevalent in the international system has given way to a
new type of realignment among nations.

The establishment of the

European trading blocs, Britain's entry into the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the movement of the United Nations towards bipartisanship such as the General Assembly's condemnation of Zionism, has created
a situation that may speed up the natural process of integration

J. McLin, Op. cit., p. 214.
Ironic in the sense that Prime Minister Trudeau acknowledged in early
1969 that the NATO/NORAD Alliances had constituted all of Canada's
foreign policy since 1945. For the Prime Minister, it was a false
perspective to have a military policy determining Canada's foreign
policy. Yet, Canada's continued participation in the NATO/NORAD
Alliance systems remains the focal point of her foreign policy.

57.
occurring between Canada and the United States.
But there is an obvious danger in Canada continuing to rely upon the
U.S. deterrent capability for mutual deterrence.

It is conceivable that

mutual deterrence could break down again,as it did during the Cuban
missile crisis in October 1962.
The defence of Canada is solely the responsibility of Canadians.

101

Although collective security agreements can be established to assist in
the defence of Canada, they offer very few guarantees that assistance
will be given when needed.

French President Charles DeGaulle understood

that the United States' nuclear deterrent by itself could not guarantee
France's sovereignty.

As a result, France withdrew from NATO in 1969

and created her own independent form of nuclear deterrence - 'Force
de Frappe' thereby placing the responsibility for France's defence in
French hands.

The combination of this independent nuclear deterrent and

certain American guarantees of sovereignty has allowed France a type of
freedom of action that she did not enjoy previous to 1969.
France was able to capitalize on certain strategic conditions
such as her focal geographic position in the NATO Alliance.

When she

decided to quit NATO in 1969, she left being fully aware that she
still sat beneath the United States nuclear umbrella.

This action is

A closer look at the voting patterns in the United Nations seems to bear
this fact out. In the early fifties the United States tended to dominate
the General Assembly. In the early sixties the Soviet Union and the
United States seemed to share in their domination of the United Nations.
Today, United Nations voting behaviour is no longer dominated by the
two superpowers but rather an alliance of voting third world nations
has changed UN voting behaviour drastically.
101
Former U.S. President Richard Nixon reminded Canadians that their
security is ultimately their personal responsibility. Refer back to
Nixon Doctrine, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future"
Op. cit. , p. 7.
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significant if viewed in its general systems context. Although the initial
conditions of existence for every nation state system influence final
outcomes, they do not determine those final outcomes.
France, having developed certain policy objectives that emphasized increased self-sufficiency, acted on those objectives and altered
the initial conditions of her existence to such an extent as to assume a
new and different equifinal position.
Canada, having a different set of initial conditions can respond
in similar ways but defence policy objectives must be established that
reflect certain political realities.
Summary
Canada's defence policy has progressed through three stages of
historical development, namely a period of dependence, a period of
interdependence and a present period of relative independence.

This

historical development can be explained in general systems theory as
the ongoing movement within every living open system towards a higher
level of differentiated existence.
However, every movement towards increased differentiation and
progressive individualization is opposed by a counter movement to
return the system to a previous level of dependence.

Canada's defence

policy has fluctuated between these two counter movements.

There are

many recommendations that can be made regarding the future of Canada's
defence policy.

The following chapter offers certain recommendations

which are based upon significant political and technological considerations.

CHAPTER III
A Future For Canadian Defence Policy ?
Prefacing Remarks:
The purpose of defence policy analysis is to make predictions about
the future based upon both a knowledge of the past and present.

In this

chapter, the future of Canada's defence policy is considered in a political,
military, and strategic continuum.
prevailing continuum

It is with an understanding of this

that recommendations on Canadian defence policy are

made.
(1) The Basic Incompatibility of Soviet
Communism and Western Liberal Democracy
In all open living systems, competition between system parts for
1
dominance leads to conflict.
In the international political system, there
is intense competition between two differing ideological systems for dominance.
These two differing political systems are the Marxist - Communist political
system as represented by the Soviet Union and the Western Liberal Democratic
system as represented by the United States of America.
The essential differences between these two opposing ideological systems
and their basic antithetical incompatibility can be more
fully understood by comparing their respective attitudes toward the individual,
the concept of property, and the role of conflict in history.
Both Soviet Marxism and Liberal Democratic thought are
philosophically

grounded in the individual and the role that he should

play in political society.

The Marxist Communist holds the view that

the values and political objectives of Marxism-Leninism and Western
Capitalism are totally incompatible with each other.

For the Marxist-

L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . , Op. cit., p. 66. Von
Bertalanffy observed in nature that competition, 'the struggle between the
parts' eventually leads to the extermination of the species with the
smaller growth capacity.
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Leninist, Western Capitalism is an outmoded structure doomed to collapse
in the path of world socialism.

2

This point of view represents much more than just a verbal exercise
in polemics.

The Marxist-Leninist ideology is both rigidly dogmatic and

highly methodical in its political doctrine and military policy.
Marxism-Leninism has successfully been able to split the individual's
life-property relationship by placing the ownership of all property in
the collective hands of the state.
Liberal democratic thought, on the other hand, holds the individual's
life-property relationship in reverence by making it the focal point of
individual existence.

In liberal democratic philosophy, every individual

has a basic inherent right to own property in support of his life.
"For each man has a right to his preservation
and hence to appropriating the necessities
of his life."3
The importance of the individual's right to the ownership of
property in liberal democratic societies cannot be underestimated.
Property and the proper use of it sustains life.

The removal of property

and the individual's right to its use threatens his continued existence.
Therefore, one must realize as the Marxist-Leninists have, that to have
property is to have power.
Although Marxism-Communism regards the individual possession of
property in its most negative, exploitive sense, the possession and use
2
Marshall V.D. Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Strategy, Third edition,
edited with an analysis and commentary by H.F. Scott, New York: Crane,
Russak Publishing Co., 1968, p. 16.
3
C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism:
Hobbes to Locke, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 142.
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of property can offer many benefits that go well beyond the fulfillment of
an individual's biological needs. For example, the possession of property
by the individual gives him a sense of distinction, a separateness from
his fellow men.

For lack of a better term, the ownership of property can

give man a personal type of freedom that sets him apart.
"Not only has the individual a property in his
person and capacities, a property in the sense
of right to enjoy and use them and exclude others
from them . . . . What makes man human is his
freedom from other men. Man's essence is freedom.
Freedom is the proprietorship of one's own person
and capacities.1"^
Once an individual assumes effective possession of any part of the
earth's bounty and puts it to his own personal use, he has then acquired
both a property right and a corresponding right to exercise whatever
power he has available to defend his property from others. For
"Man hath by nature a Power . . . to preserve
his property, that is his Life, Liberty and
Estate."5
The natural systemic competitiveness between various individuals
in society to protect existing properties as well as acquire new properties
creates a situation of potential conflict among men.

As a result of this

competitiveness leading to potential conflict, political society has grown
out of the recognition of the necessity to orderly structure the defence
of properties belonging to a large number of individuals.

Ibid., p. 142.
The individual right to property is important in a general systems
context. One of the major isomorphic characteristics in general systems
theory is progressive differentiation, the movement away from a more
general and homogeneous state to a more specialized and heterogeneous
condition of existence. L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . .
• • s Op. cit., p. 211.
Ibid., p. 19 8. For original source, refer to Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
'Of Property' section 87.
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"Society consists of relations of exchange between
proprietors. Political society becomes a
calculated device for the protection of this
property and for the maintenance of an orderly
relation of exchange. "°
The opposing point of view to this interpretation of the lifeproperty relationship in liberal democratic philosophy infers that
property ownership is a culturally learned characteristic rather than
a biological necessity,
"Private property is the child of culture and
develops into a major pre-occupation only with
the evolution of complex society. Allegiance
to territory rather than one's kin is a
relatively recent development in human history
accompanying the invention of the state."7
The Marxist-Leninist concept of private property is very similar
to this point of view, however, property is thought of exclusively in
Q

terms of social class and economic relationships. Political society is
composed of two antithetical forces, namely those who control the economic
means of production (i.e. the bourgeois class) and those who have only
their labour to contribute to that economic relationship (i.e. the
proletariat class).
For the Marxist-Communist, political society evolves from the
perpetual conflict resulting from the struggle between these two antithetical forces of economic existence.

The liberal democrat, on the

C.B. Macpherson, Op. cit., p. 3. From this point of view, one can infer
that the function of defence is to protect individual property which
sustains human life.
A. Allard, The Human Imperative, New York: Columbia University Press,
1972, p. 64.
' In the words of Karl Marx, the theory of Communism is the abolition of
private property. Refer to Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, The Communist
Manifesto with Introduction by Leon Trotsky, New York: Pathfinder Press,
1970, p. 28.

other hand regards the evolution of political society more as a result
9
of social consensus rather than social conflict.
While Marxism-Communism views human existence in the more negative
context of conflict, democratic liberalism regards human existence in a
positive sense.

Competition between individuals and nation states is

encouraged, any conflict resulting from this natural systemic
competition is often regarded as unnatural and unhealthy.

Herein lies

the contradiction that liberal democracy has failed to see.
In all open living systems, systemic competition over finite
natural resources results in potential conflict between system parts.
For
"If a system does not permit 'conflict' it
prevents adjustment thereby it maximizes the danger of catastrophic breakdown (spasm-war)."
In Marxist-Communist doctrine, human conflict and the promotion
of it is essential in the attainment of every Marxist's true finality,
namely 'the socialist state'.

The following basic principles flowing

from conflict can be realized in Marxist-Communist ideology:

Guidelines for Communist
11
Promotion of Conflict
(a) War and Peace have no meaning or place in the Communist
concept of the nation-in-arms.

An unending struggle is

9

Jean Jacques Rousseau's Social Contract embodies the general belief in
man's potential reason as indicated by the fact that a social consensus
between individuals can be reached through common agreement.

10
N. Nyiri, Alternatives to Nuclear Warfare . . . . Vol. I, Op. cit., p.
These guidelines have been adapted for this thesis from the unpublished
manuscript of Lt. Col. D.G. Loomis, On Conflict, Ottawa: Dept. of
National Defence, April 1st, 1969, pp. 308-309.
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envisaged against counter-revolutionaries acting
either within the state or outside of it.
(b) Conflict is of a four-fold nature—diplomatic, economic,
psychological and, as a last resort, military.

It is

possible to have many combinations of offense and defence
in any or all of these spheres.
(c) A Communist has no loyalty except to Communism.

Thus, a

Communist cannot be loyal to any nation, state, institution,
or person save those nations, states, institutions, or
persons which are Communist.

For a Communist, the nation

state is only a temporary stage of equifinal position
along the road leading to the perfect socialist state.

(d) To every revolution, there will be a counter-revolution.
For every Communist, conflict is both an inevitable and
desirable state of affairs.
(e) Success in conflict is contingent on an alliance with the
least privileged classes of society.
variations of relative privilege.

Every society has

Thus, every society is

vulnerable to Communism.
(f) Always act offensively in as many spheres as possible.
principle is closely related to the next one.

This

The ideal is

a combined diplomatic, psychological, economic, and military
offensive.

In any case, offensive action in the diplomatic,

economic, and psychological spheres cannot be successful
unless a strong military potential exists.

For this reason,

the Soviet Union has continued to maintain large armed forces.
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(g) All actions must be properly timed.

In particular, the

timing of offensive actions is governed by crisis. The
most serious crisis for a Capitalistic state is an
economic one.

The second most serious is a military

one.

Although an economic crisis in a capitalist country works very
much in favour of the Communists, economics is also 'the Achilles heel1
of the Soviet system of government.

The continued existence of liberal

democracy based upon a free enterprise or market economy remains the
major threat to World Communism.
If the capitalist or free enterprise nations continue to lead the
Communist nations in every conceivable economic standard of comparison,
then the very basis of Communism will be threatened.

For example, the

military and technological advances of western democratic nations in
the late fifties and early sixties were perceived as a very real threat
to the continuation of Communism.
"The military revolution came as a severe
blow to Communist ideology: the Marxist
thesis that capitalism was doomed because
it had already exhausted all possibilities
for effective development of productive
forces was clearly disapproved by the
discovery and adaptation in the capitalist
camp of nuclear energy."12
(h) Conflict is conducted by different means in different
fields.

This implies the well known principle of w a r -

flexibility.

12„.
Nikolai Galay "The Soviet Approach to the Modern Molitary Revolution"
in John Erickson (ed.) The Military-Technical Revolution: Its Iiruoact
on Strategy and Foreign Policy, New York: F.A. Praeger Publishers,
1966, p. 20.
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(i) Foreign policy and internal affairs of a Communist
state must be closely related.

A state's internal

policies can be directed to bring about conditions
that are favourable to the realization of that state's
long term political objectives.

13

Foreign policy, on the other hand, can be utilized in the preparation for war by signing treaties, forming coalitions and safeguarding
the neutrality of neighbouring countries.

14

For the Soviet Union, since conflict is considered to be inevitable,
then all government policy must be directed in such a way as to ensure
final victory.

(j) The actions of one state must determine the actions of
others.

In non-Communist states this arises only

indirectly through trade and commerce and sometimes
military war.

However, the nation-in-arms will always

strive to influence the external and internal affairs
of other states.
(k) The overthrow of Capitalism is impossible without
violence.

Liberal Capitalism based upon market economy

is recognized as the main threat to Communism.

Other

classes of opposition or counter-revolutionaries are
recognized, but these may be overcome without violence
or resorting to military action.

Some examples are

Middle East nationalism, Far East "neutralism" and so on.

While an all-out nuclear holocaust is to be avoided, violence will

13
Marshall V.D. Sokolovsky, Op. cit., p. II
14,Ibid^, p. II

still be required in the form of peaceful coexistence.
"Peaceful coexistence by their (Soviet) definition
means pursuing a vigorous policy of expanding
their influence and power by any expedient means
short of war. "•'•5
In answer to the question on whether or not the values of Soviet
Communism are compatible with those of liberal democratic nations, the
reply must be an emphatic no.
The values of Marxism-Communism are completely antithetical to the
values of liberal democratic philosophy.

While Communist ideology is

grounded in both the inevitability and necessity for human conflict,
western liberal democracies regard human conflict as being neither
inevitable nor a desirable state of affairs.
The following table of comparisons between the two ideological
systems indicates the real degree of asymetry that exists on every
practical level of analysis.

Marxist-Leninist system
limited "open" system

Parts

<

Whole

FIGURE A-2

Liberal Democratic system
an "open" system

Parts

>

Whole
cont'd

15
R. Garthoff "Military Power in Soviet Policy" in John Erickson (ed.)
' Op. cit. , p. 239.

con't

Ideological Table of Comparisons

Marxist-Leninist system

Liberal Democratic system

Ideological differences

Ideological differences

1. Life ^ property relationship
severed (no private ownership of
property allowed)

Life = property relationship
protected by law (private ownership of property fully endorsed)

2• Domination of Parts by the Whole
System parts (individuals) interrelate to achieve objectives set
by the whole (i.e. The Communist
Party)

Domination of Whole by the Parts
individual parts interrelate to
achieve objectives set by the parts.

3. Status/ Encirclement by Capitalism
makes defence necessary as Capitalism
is both predatory and aggressive by
nature^"

Status/ Defence becomes necessary
as Communism is hostile to the
continuation of Capitalism

4. Achievements/Defence of revolutionary
gains: freedom from exploitation,
slavery and poverty of Czarist Russia

Achievements/Defence of democratic
liberalism and its gains: liberty,
equality, individual freedom and
a high standard of living

5• Sovereignty of the nation state
Sovereignty of the Soviet Union
considered essential: Integration
with west would threaten Marxist
ideology

Sovereignty of the nation state
Sovereignty of democratic states
considered outdated. Global
interdependence and integration
sought as long range goal-'-7

From these ideological differences comes the realization that liberal
democratic nations like the United States and Canada have shown a
dedication to strategies that promote stability, preservation of the
status quo, and the balance of power rather than seeking conquest and
final solution through the methodical use of controlled conflict.

16.
Marshall V.D. Sokolovsky, Op. cit., p. 40.
17
Ervin Laszlo, A Strategy for the Future .

18

• Op. cit., p. 144.

^Stefan Possony, J. Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology: Winning the
Decisive War, Cambridge, Mass.: University Press of Dunellen, 1970, p. 3.
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On the other hand, the Soviet Union has shown it self to be true
to Marxist-Leninist ideology by utilizing all of its national
capabilities to promote conflict with the prospect of bringing about
19
the downfall of western democratic societies.

It is in this perspect-

ive of understanding the purposes behind the Soviet military policy and
learning from past Soviet behaviour that democratic nations respond with
counter military strategies to offset any advantages that Soviet
military strategy may have gained.

Canada's contribution to western

military strategy can be significant in countering Soviet military
strategy.

However, before counter strategies can be offered to challenge

Soviet strategy, it is important that present American and Soviet military
strategy be examined in light of military technology so that the strengths
and weaknesses of each can be fully understood before endeavouring to
make any recommendations on policy for Canada and western democratic
nations in general.

(2) U.S./Soviet Strategic Policy
and Present Military Technology

Although Von Clausewitz argued that it was misleading to' think
that dependence on any one particular weapon by itself makes for a
successful strategy, it is accepted fact that military technology and

19
Ibid., p. 3.
If there is one thing that can be said about the past political
behaviour of Soviet Communism, it would be that it has shown a high
degree of consistency in regards to its commitment to MarxismLeninism. This has been an obvious advantage to the Communists but
also it is a potential weakness worthy of exploitation.
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new weapons systems play a very leading role in shaping both the
character of a nation's military strategy as well as influencing those
policy options chosen.
"Technology is dynamic, no one can agree to
stand still. Force relationships change in
the course of armament cycles despite the best
planning possible . . . .
New technologies
create new power."20
Every nation, no matter how large or how small, is affected by
these new developments in weapons technology and the resultant policies
that nations pursue in response to this technology.

This has never been

more evident than in the present nuclear age.
In the early fifties, the Soviet Union found it self in a position
of technical inferiority when it came to military technology.

Although

the Soviets possessed a large inventory of nuclear bombs of sufficient
megatonnage, they lacked the necessary transport systems todeliver their
nuclear payloads to North American shores.

As an alternative to this

deficiency, the Soviets resorted to building up large conventional forces
in Europe with the purpose of holding United States' European allies
hostage.

21

In the latter part of the fifties and early sixties, the Soviet
Union embarked on a crash program of offensive weapons development to
lessen the technological gap that existed between themselves and the
Americans.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were

produced in sufficient numbers to make it possible for the Soviet
Union to strike at American cities. At the same time as the Soviets were
attempting to improve upon their inferior weapons position, the United

20
S. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op. cit., p. 187.
Morton Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy, Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1967, p. 57.
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States had serious concerns about the escalating arms race
and feared that it could lead to the outbreak of an all-out nuclear
war.
The strategic policy of the United States in the early sixties was
one of assured destruction.

22

This was almost exclusively an offensive

strategy in that the United States relied on its offensive capability to
assure the destruction of some specified fraction of the population and
industry of the potential enemy after the United States had absorbed the
best blows the enemy could offer.

23

This policy of assured destruction was a limited policy in that it
offered no counter force capabilities to destroy the enemy's strike force
and the American response to any threat was strictly a singular one, all
out nuclear war.
However, since the United States still enjoyed a comfortable
weapons advantage over the Soviet Union due basically to its military
technology, which had devised new types of nuclear missiles that were
more accurate and more easily controlled in terms of damage limitation,
the United States indicated a willingness to negotiate on arms limitation
with the Soviet Union.

24

A general sophistication and refinement in

nuclear weapons technology had made it possible to negotiate down from
all-out nuclear war by introducing new partial strategies that.offered
greater flexibility in response.
In June of 1962, American Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
introduced his famous controlled flexible response strategy whereby the
22
S. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op. cit., p. 111.
23
Ibid., p. 111.
24
Morton Halperin, Op. cit., p. 81.
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United States would agree not to target its massive offensive nuclear
capability on the heavily populated areas of the Soviet Union.

It

was the hope of the Kennedy administration that the Soviets would respond
in kind, however the Soviet Union flatly rejected the American proposal
because of its inferior technological position.
In the latter part of the sixties and early seventies, the United
States continued to indicate a willingness to negotiate with the Soviet
Union on arms limitation but the Soviets displayed little interest in
....

J
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limiting weapons development.
Soviet strategic policy, on the other hand, has assumed a different
approach than that of the Americans.

The strategic policy of the Soviet

Union is a policy of assured survival and not assured destruction.

98

This policy is explainable in that the Soviet Union, having been in an
inferior technological position for a long period of time, conceded
the United States a first strike capability but recognized that the United
States had weaknesses in areas of active defence.
The Soviet Union responded to this weakness by installing substantial defences and counterforce weapons to ensure that the United
25
Ibid., p. 77.
Ibid., p. 85.
27
During the Nixon administration of 1968 and the Ford administration
of 1974, United States authorities have talked of establishing a
position of guaranteed parity or 'mutual equivalence1 with the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's failure to respond to such
initiatives seems to be indicative of their attitude regarding the
inevitability of conflict. For more details on U.S. negotiating
stance, refer to Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger in his
report to Congress: The Annual Defense Department Report for the
Year 197 5, Washington: D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1974.
oo

S. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op, cit., p. 113.
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States would be unable to destroy more than a portion of the Soviet
Union and its satellite countries.

29

In many ways, the Soviet strategy is a logical one.

If the

Soviet Union can continue to reduce the credibility of the U.S.
assured destruction capability by increasing her active defence measures
at home then the United States assured destruction capability could
become a form of national suicide.
In recent years, U.S. strategic policy has lost any flexibility
it may have had.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, with its emphasis

on survivability and improving her defensive capabilities may tend to
dominate military strategy in the near future. For
". . . the technical future, at least most
immediately, clearly lies with greater
accuracy, with defence, and with counter- „..
force capabilities (or at least potential)."
Furthermore, the Soviet Union has certain other advantages in
developing her military technology that the United States does not have.
For example, the Soviets, unlike the Americans, have a very centralized
or focalized approach for developing military technology and all
technology in general.
This is in part due to the strong reciprocal relationship between
Soviet technology and those political objectives being sought by the
Soviet Union.

All aspects of Soviet life are made to conform to these

29
Ibid., p. 113.
30
Ibid., p. 114.
31
Desmond Ball "United States Strategic Doctrine and Policy - With Some
Implications for Australia" in R. O'Neill (ed.) The Strategic Nuclear
Balance: An Australian Perspective, Papers from the Conference at
Strategic and Defence Studies Center Research School of Pacific Studies,
Australian National University, Canberra, 1974, p. 42.
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political objectives.

The Soviet economic system reflects this

conformity.
"The decisive advantage of the Soviet socialist
state over the bourgeois states is the fact that
the socialist structure assumes a more perfect
economic organization of society; this is of
decisive significance for the defensive power
of a state." 32
North American democratic societies, on the other hand, tend to
be dominated by the parts (i.e. individuals) rather than by the whole
(i.e. the state).

As a result, the approach to problem solving tends

to be more varied and disseminated in the sense that greater variety and
divergence seems to prevail.
As stated in the previous section of this chapter, Soviet Communism
regards conflict as an ongoing state of human affairs.

Since

conflict is inevitable then it is imperative that the Soviet Union persevere in any conflict situation.

Technology and the mastery of It holds

the key to Soviet attainment of this goal.
As a result, the Soviet Union has focused a large proportion of
her GNP (Gross National Product) on the development of heavy industry,
air defence, and maintaining large conventional ground forces.

33

What this has meant for the Soviet Union is that certain sacrifices
be made in areas of human need and consumer technology so that a technological advantage in weapons systems could be acquired.

The United States,

Marshall V.D. Sokolovsky, Op. cit., p. 30.
M. Halperin, Op. cit., p. 59. The Soviet Union, unlike the United
States, regards defence policy decisions as not basically economic
decisions but rather tends to regard them as political decisions.
U.S. operational researchers and systems analysists often view U.S.
policy options more in terms of cost effectiveness than objective
effectiveness. For more details on United States defence policy
planning see E.S. Quade, W. Boucher (eds.) Systems Analysis and
Policy Planning Applications in Defence (New York: Elsevier Pub.
Co., 1968), pp. 1-19 inclusive.

having more economic resources than the Soviet Union, has tended to
scatter her research and technological developments in various areas
of human need to improve individual life styles.
These different approaches to technology and its uses have created
a legitimate concern about the future.
"The point is despite the enormous western
superiority in total quantity of technological
resources, the USSR has been able to concentrate
more effort than we have on selected portions
of weapons technology and to gain local
„,
superiority in many phases of military technology."
This situation works in the interests of Soviet Communism.

The United

States, being a 'capitalist bourgeois society' must be destroyed, thus
ending the inevitable dilemma of comparisons between two ideological
systems that are asymetrical to each other.
Also, many in the west hold the view that technology can be halted
35
by signing agreements and treaties.

But this is a false

perspective in the sense that technology may be slowed down but it never
can be halted.

To halt technology would mean to stop growth and develop-

ment which are two essential isomorphic characteristics visible to some
j
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degree in all living organisms.
A closer examination of the objectives of Soviet military policy
indicates how comprehensive the Soviet threat is.

The four

basic objectives of Soviet military policy are built one upon the other
to indicate a multi-tiered type of total strategy.

These objectives are

the following:
(a) avoid nuclear war
(b) build up mutual deterrence capability to offset
34s. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op. cit., p. 22.
Ibid., p. 26.
36
L. Von Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of Development. . . . Op. cit. , p.

35
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U.S. nuclear capability
(c) maintain a strong continental military position
in Europe and Asia
(d) the Soviet Union must continue to develop more mobile
and versatile conventional forces, i.e. naval and
maritime capabilities to support its interests in the
Third World and to sustain its role as a global
37
competitor to the U.S.
This is significant if one recalls that Communism refers to flexibility
or the ability to act offensively in as many spheres as possible at all
O Q

times, as being one of the principal guidelines for promoting conflict.
In recent years, the Soviet Union has embarked on an impressive
type of 'Blue Water Strategy' whereby its naval forces have been expanded
to act as an instrument for the global support of Soviet interests rather
39
than as merely an adjunct to Soviet land power.
This development should not be underestimated in its importance for
in the present era of strategic nuclear deterrence,control of the world's
oceans could alter existing world political strategy and disturb economic
and social conditions in Third World countries.

40

To meet this Soviet threat, it is essential that western democratic
37
Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1970, p. 428.
38
Lt. Gen. D.G. Loomis, Op. cit., p. 309.
39
Thomas Wolfe, Op. cit., p. 442. The Soviet merchant marine has been
expanded in recent years to complement her already impressive navy.
40
General A. Beaufre, Strategy for Tomorrow with introduction by
R. Foster, New York: Crane, Russat and Co., 1974, p. 65.
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nations such as the United States and Canada devise a total strategy
that is capable of covering not merely the phenomenon of the nuclear
weapon and its possible successors (outer-space, biological warfare etc.)
but also the more limited problems of indirect warfare.

41

Nothing less than a total strategy will suffice in the present
era of nuclear technology.

Nuclear weapons are total weapons; total in

their effect and total in the effort required to sophisticate them and
maintain them.
In the previous period of conventional weapons, the quantity of
weapons and not necessarily the quality of the weapon used often turned
the course of battle.

An enemy could be overcome by the sheer force of

numbers.
In the present nuclear age, weapons numbers, although still
significant, have given way to other equally crucial considerations such
as the quality of weapon systems being used and their survivability
under conditions of attack.

42

Presently, military technology and subsequently military strategy
is being revolutionized by the use of the computer.

Computer technology

is bringing strange and highly complex weapon systems out of the pages

"General A. Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy With Particular
Reference to Problems of Defence, Politics, Economics and Diplomacy
in the Nuclear Age, translated by Major General R.H. Barry with
preface by B.H. Liddell Hart, London: Faber and Faber Publishing
Co., 1966, p. 99.
S. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op_L_cvti_, p. 10.

of science fiction and applying them in the global battlefield.

43

Total weapons require total strategies from nations that hope to
control their use and not to be controlled by them.

It is in this

context of a total weapon requiring a total strategy that Canada's
defence policy can play a vital role in defending Canada from her
enemies and contributing to the defence of the western world.

( 3) Recommendations in Canadian Defence Policy
Since the prevailing military technology significantly affects
the determination of viable defence policy options, a nation must bring
its defence policy in line with both this prevailing military technology
as well as those general political objectives being sought by the nation
as a whole.
As stated previously in chapter one, finalities (i.e. political
objectives) play a very significant part in the behavioural activity of
all open living systems.

Although the behavioural activity of all

open living systems is both naturally purposive and goal directed, man's

43
For example, the United States is experimenting with computer
operated bombers which can fly long range bombing missions without
requiring any type of human intervention. Also, the United States
army has designed a lightweight laser gun that enables individual
battlefield soldiers to hit and destroy their target from one mile
away. Although these advances along with numerous others of
varying complexity seem bizarre to a conventional war mentality,
they do exist and thus become a part of the military strategy of
the nations that possess them. For more details on computer
weaponry, refer to Phil Stanford "The Global Automated Battlefield"
in D. Johnson, B. Schneider (eds.) Current Issues in U.S. Defence
Policy, Center for Defense Information, New York: Praeger Publishing
Co., 1976, pp. 202-207 inclusive.
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social systems allow for the possibility of human intervention and
the superimposition of new finalities on top of nature's pre-existing
ones.
If a nation's defence policy and subsequently its foreign policy
do no more than respond to changes in weapon system technologies then
over time such stimulus-response behaviour will prove to be both costly
and ineffective.

This is a problem of organization, or more specific-

ally, a lack of it.
For too long, Canada's defence policy has assumed an 'ad hoc' jJ^*44
nature in responding to conflict situations after they have occurred.
In general systems theory, this type of system behaviour results from
a lack of foresight of the goal sought by the dominant system parts,
namely its decision makers.
(a) A National Security Policy for Canada
At present, Canada lacks a national security policy which could
be directed towards creating a unified and harmonious Canadian society
and assisting in minimizing the potential for conflict in the world.
A national security policy would be more relevant

45

than reaffirming often

ambiguous and ill-defined political objectives in a defence policy
review which is done every four or five years.
It would involve devising a total technological strategy to draw
upon every aspect of Canadian life.

The major objectives of such a

44
Lt. Col. D.G. Loomis, On Conflict . . . . Op. cit., p. 255.
45

Ibid., p. 256.
Denis Stairs, "The Military as an Instrument . . . ," Loc. cit., p. 87.
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national security policy would be threefold in approach;
(i)

To prevent war - Canada would continue to uphold
existing mutual deterrence responsibilities in the
48
NATO/NORAD Alliances.

However, Canada would be

required to field modern armed forces with modern
high energy weapons.

49

(
•
"
*
•
) To devise a national indirect strategy - This
is a multi-faceted approach to 'legitimize' the
defence of Canada by making Canadians aware of
it.

This would be done by the creation of various

government policies to inform the Canadian public
about the facts of modern war and conflict with
the purpose of strengthening the Canadian will

47

General headings adapted from General A. Beaufre, Deterrence and
Strategy . . . . Op. cit., p. 127.

48
It is no longer a question of whether or not Canada should remain
in these two alliance systems because they have succeeded in keeping
the peace for the last two decades. But rather the questions involving Canada's continuing contributions to the NATO/NORAD Alliances
relates to questions of logistics, namely what force levels should
be maintained, what roles and missions performed and the geographic
distribution of resources. For more details refer to Lt. Col. D.G.
Loomis, Op. cit., p. 267.
49
S. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op. cit., p. 6. It is no longer sufficient
to rely on mass mobilization as in previous World Wars. Present
military technology does not allow sufficient time for a nation to
mobilize. Canada must maintain sufficient conventional forces to
ensure against a surprise action. Sufficient conventional forces
does not infer large numbers but rather a superior fighting force
equipped with the most up-to-date weapons.
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to resis
Educational programs should be instituted to
educate the Canadian public on the value in having
a truly 'professional' armed forces.

Hopefully,

such programs would restore a sense of self identity
and a professional 'esprit de corps' within the
rank and file of Canada's armed forces,
(ill) To win the war - This would involve the development
of a highly sophisticated and modern technological
base that would be capable of providing Canada's
armed forces with multi-level support in both
weapons and other technical support.

This

Herman Kahn has made the interesting observation that after the first
use of nuclear weapons against the west, there is likely to be 'a
shock reaction' among western populations. Although the damage may
only be limited, the citizenry, unaccustomed to such damage may
tend to exaggerate the damage impact. This 'shock reaction'
combined with a general lack of public knowledge of what options
of counter-attack are available may pressure western leaders to
negotiate for peace. The national will to resist is at its
strongest when there is an informed public. For more details on
Kahn's argument, see Brig. Gen. D.G. Loomis, "Reorganization on
Basis of a Total Force Concept" in Canadian Defence Quarterly
Vol. V #3 Winter 1975/76, p. 14.
Since the Second World War, the Canadian military has suffered from
problems of poor morale and a high rate of attrition as a result of
not being able to establish a self identity and personal relevance
in Canadian society. The primary nature of defensive activity has
not been given the significant position among government policies
that it deserves. Hopefully, future research in defence policy
will concern itself with developing a general theory of defence.
For more details on the military's search for recognition, see
R.B. Byers, Colin Gray, Canadian Military Professionalism: The
Search for Identity, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International
Affairs, 1973.
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recommendation could be perceived by the Canadian
government as being a sensitive one since it
relates to the possible resurrection of a viable
defence production industry in Canada.

52

An objective analysis of Canada's weapons
requirements combined with an appreciation of what
roles and capabilities she best performs is required
so that Canadian industry can be utilized to produce
those weapons most suitable to performing Canada's
defence roles.

It is questionable that a country

such as Canada, with one of the highest GNPs should
continue to make the lowest contribution of that
GNPfor such a primary task as defence.

Defence production in Canada is a highly sensitive political issue.
Its ramifications cut across the breadth of Canadian economic life.
Since Canada signed the Defence Production Sharing Agreement in
1958-1963, she has found herself in an unusual economic relationship with her partner, the United States. At present, various
Canadian industries (e.g. the electronics industry) build component
parts for American weapon systems, selling those component parts to
the United States and then turning around and buying back the
finished product to fulfil Canada's defence commitments. It seems
that for every Canadian dollar made on the sale of component parts
to the United States, two or more dollars are spent by the Canadian
government to buy back a finished product that the Canadian government had initially financed to build. It may be more economically
and socially feasible if these Canadian defence dollars were spent
in Canada to finance Canadian defence production industries, thereby creating new jobs for Canada's unemployed. For more details
on defence production sharing, refer to A. Axline (ed.) Continental
Community: Independence and Integration in North America, Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1974, pp. 116-135.
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(b) Strategic Re-Organization and a Total Force Concept

53

Although it would be advantageous for Canada to have a national
security policy, it would be of little value unless some form of
organizational structure existed to turn political and military
objectives into operational policy.

As stated earlier, organization

is the essence of all life.
However, any organization is of little value unless that organization is directed towards those desired goals selected by the
dominant parts of the system.

If there is a lack of foresight or some

confusion exists as to what those goals or objectives are, then as is
often the case in large organizations, organizational structure can
motivate the day—to-day activity of such organizations.

54

Since large organizations such as defence establishments are
composed of individual members, these individuals naturally bring their
own goals and objectives to the organization.
"The specificity and grouping of such individuals
assumes a finality, as they do of every group
of people which tries to find the conditions
necessary for survival."55
As a result, the component parts of the organization become preoccupied with questions of form such as organizational structure while

53
The total force concept is adapted from the article by Brig. General
D.G. Loomis, "Reorganization on Basis of a Total Force Concept",
Op. cit. , pp. 1-14.
54
L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . , Op. cit., p. 7 8.
55
J.P. Moreigne, "Military Management: A Fantasm or a Necessity?" in
M.R. Van Gils (ed.) The Perceived Role of the Military, Rotterdam
University Press, 1971, p. 237.

questions of policy and substance tend to become a secondary .concern.
If the dominant parts of the system (i.e. the political decision
makers) do not exercise sufficient control and direction over the system
parts (i.e. government departments, committees, subcommittees etc.) then
the essential continuity between intent of an action, the idea motivating
it, the form taken to administer it and the action itself, is severed
by this lack of control.
In the Department of National Defence, certain technical responsibilities could be more clearly differentiated from each other and
reclassified.

For example, it has been recommended that the task of

strategic analysis be further subdivided into strategic planning and
strategic control.

56

Strategic planning would involve the scientist,

technologist, and political theorist wading through the complicated
scientific and technical jargon of military technology with the purpose
of making recommendations on policy.

This process of strategic planning

would be open to all elements of Canadian society to contribute in making
a truly national defence policy.

57

(See Figure A-3.)

However, defence policy is much more than merely a series of
responses to changes in initial conditions, be they strategic or technological in nature.

A nation's defence policy is a political issue as well

The political aspect of defence policy planning relates to the.need for
! 58
strategic control.
Lt. General D.G. Loomis, On Conflict . . . . , Op. cit., pp. 256-257,
57
Ibid., p. 257.
Ibid., p. 258.

FIGURE A-3:
The Elements of a Technological Strategy
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Reproduced from S. Possony, J. Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology
. . , Op. cit. , p. 60.

When all available information has been gathered, analyzed and
policy recommendations have been made, political authority must be
exercised to turn recommendations into operational policy.
Today, unlike ever before, the demands on a political decision
maker's time and competency are extremely great.

In matters of military

strategy, he must be capable of transcending the immediate concerns
of logistics which tend to prevail yet be able to see all the possible
futures that technology and the technologists will thrust upon him. 59
He must be a generalist who is both capable of understanding the
nuances involved in issues of particular interest while understanding
those same issues in the totality of all things.

At the best of times,

this description is one of an extraordinary man.
The awesome nature of this responsibility combined with the fact
that Canada's political decision makers have indicated an aversion
towards the politically sensitive problem of defence , it is recommended that a National Defence Council of Canada (NDCC) or a Security Council
of Canada (SCC) be established along the lines of its American counterpart, the National Security Council.

(Refer to Figure A-4.)

The NDCC or SCC would shift the singular burden of responsibility f
defence from the shoulders of a political decision maker with partisan
interests to the collective shoulders of high ranking decision makers
(i.e. parliamentary leaders), strategists, and scientists alike.

To

avoid the problem of political partisanship, the NDCC or SCC would be
responsible to Parliament in general and not just to the government in
power.
These recommendations for change in those organizations responsible
for making defence policy, administering it, and analyzing its possible
59
S. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op. cit. , pp. 88-89.
N. Nyiri, Alternatives to Nuclear Warfare . . . , Occasional Paper
#2, Op. cit., p. 460.
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Reproduced from Lt. Col, D. G. Loomis, On Conflict, unpublished manuscript, Canada.
Department of National Defence, Ottawa: April 1, 1969, p. 260.
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weaknesses will not, by themselves, constitute a successful defence
policy.

As stated previously in chapter one, defensive activity as a

primary function of all open living systems occurs on all hierarchial
levels.
Defence of the sovereign nation state must be regarded by western
democratic nations as a total system activity requiring a total system
response.

Mass mobilization of a national population and the Napoleonic

concept of the 'Levee en masse' are outmoded in the present weapons age
where response time is a matter of minutes if not seconds.
A military technology of total weapons requires both a response
in terms of a total strategy and a total force.
"The concept of a total force embodies the
idea of generating military forces in a
number of pre-planned stages to meet various
levels of emergency. "°1
The total force concept is a radically new idea in the history of
military strategy.

It does not mean having numerically large armed

forces but rather a well equipped, well organized armed forces capable
,•

,

.

.

.

.

.

62

of responding by stages to any given crisis situation.
However, a national militia by itself without a civilian support
counterpart does not constitute a total force.
"To meet the requirements for these new dynamic
organizations in an economic and safe fashion
a mobilization base is required within our
society which includes not only that traditional ,_
militia but also its equivalent civil components."
61
Brig. General D.G. Loomis, "Re-organization on Basis of a Total Force
Concept . . . ," Op. cit. , p. 9.
62

Ibid. , p. 9.

63
Lt. General D.G. Loomis, Op. cit., p. 282.
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To organize Canada's armed forces along the lines of a total force
concept would require categorizing the type of potential conflict that could
occur between situations of absolute peace and total war and then responding
to each corresponding threat with the appropriate force commitment. ( See
Figure A-5.)

This represents a marked departure from the previous home

defence commitment of earlier Canadian governments that regarded "the defence
of Canada and Western Europe as ultimately one operation."

64

A major advantage of the total force concept is that it offers a
certain degree of flexible response.

Also, total force could prove

to be an economical system of organization capable of coping with
internal and external conflict situations as well as providing a sense
of self identity for Canada's armed forces.

(4)

Summary

The future of Canada's defence policy will very much be dependent
on international political and strategic conditions that will not be
of her own choosing.

At present, two antithetical political systems,

Soviet Communism and Western Liberal Democracy are in constant competition
with each other for systems dominance.
While Soviet Communism is philosophically committed to the promotion
of conflict, western liberal democracies regard social consensus as a
more desirable state of human affairs.

64
The Honourable Brooke Claxton, Canada s Defence Programme, Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1949, p. 12.
Brig. General D.G. Loomis, On Conflict, Op. cit. , p. 277.
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The natural competition between these two dominant system parts
has extended into military and weapons technology.

Under these

international conditions, Canada's defence policy must develop a
national security policy that would work towards controlling the outbreak of conflict on whatever level it may occur.

Also, a national

security organization with the responsibility to develop defence policy
options should be established.
In the present era of total weapons, Canada must develop both a
total strategy and a total force to provide for the direct and indirect
defence of Canada.

CHAPTER IV
Observations and Conclusions
Observations
Most of the present research being done in Canadian defence
policy has tended to be both partial in nature and singular in approach.
Few attempts have been made to study the problem of Canadian defence
policy on a higher level of analysis.
What seems to be warranted is a theoretical inquiry that would
conceivably explain existing phenomena and offer recommendations for
change based upon these observations.

As well, a theoretical inquiry

would be required to obey certain basic principles for conducting a
truly scientific analysis.
General systems theory is the type of analytical theory that
closely approximates the objective of attaining the highest level of
inquiry while still remaining firmly grounded in the pure sciences.
In general systems theory, all living open systems situated on the
various levels of nature's hierarchy display certain isomorphic characteristics that they hold in common with each other.
Many of these reoccuring characteristics are antithetical to
each other.

This is representative of the basic duality that exists

everywhere in nature.

For example, the characteristics of progressive

centralization and progressive individualization, competition of parts

Taylor, A.M., "Evolution-Revolution, General Systems Theory and Society"
in R. Gotesky, E. Laszlo (eds.) Evolution-Revolution, New York: Gordon
and Breach Publishing Co., 1971, p. 111.
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and domination of parts, entropy and negentropy, anabolism and catabolism
in general systems theory are indicative of this basic duality in nature.
Secondly, the other basic principle derived from general systems
theory is that organization is the essence of all life.
system is totally self-sufficient.

No living open

Instead, every living open system

can acquire a relative degree of self-sufficiency or independence by
competing for systems dominance with the other parts of the system.
Increased independence of action is only possible through increased
interdependence.
Also, the purpose or 'true finality' of every living open system
is to ensure its survival by maintaining itself and its identity.

As a

result of the system's true finality, the defensive activities of every
living open system are directed in such a way as to be directly supportive of this purpose.
With all living open systems, the interaction of system parts
results in competition within systems and between particular systems
for those finite system properties that sustain life.

This natural

competitiveness gives rise to conditions that are conducive, for
creating potential conflict between system parts.
From these general systems observations, it is possible to draw
certain basic conclusions regarding defence as a total system activity
and defence policy as a total system response.

Conclusions
The function of all defensive activity in the nation state
system is motivated by the desire to control the potential conflict
arising from the natural competitiveness occurring within that
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particular nation state system and between competing nation state
systems.
More specifically, a nation state's defence policy is a rational
response by that nation's political authorities to control the conflict
resulting from the natural competitiveness of open systems thus maintaining that political system in its entirety.

Defence establishments

are merely the organizational means by which the potential for conflict
can be 'professionalized' as to make final victory possible.
In the international political system, the two antithetical political
forces of Marxist Communism and Western Liberal Democracy compete with
each other for systems dominance. As is characteristic in the basic dualism
of nature, Soviet Communism and Western Liberal Democracy are completely
antithetical to each other.
Soviet Communism regards conflict and the promotion of conflict
as an inevitable and desirable state of human affairs.

Liberal democracy,

on the other hand, regards social consensus and not conflict as more
indicative of the human condition.
As a result of these two essential differences, Communist nations
and western democratic nations have responded according to their respective beliefs.

In the Soviet Union, defence assumes a focal position in

Soviet life.

It has become a total system activity requiring a total

system response.
Soviet military strategy reflects this primary concern with
defending the Soviet Union by having developed a highly comprehensive yet
flexible total strategy.

It. is flexible in the sense that it operates

at all times in as many spheres of potential conflict as possible.

92.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union has adopted a total system strategy
whereby all aspects of Soviet life are considered to be supportive of
its political and ideological ambitions.

Defence policy decisions are

inherently political decisions and not primarily decisions of cost
effectiveness and economic feasibility.

Western liberal democratic nations

such as the United States and Canada represent the opposing position in
this aspect of nature's duality.
Defence has not been elevated to a primary function of the nation
state system in democratic societies as is the case in Marxist Communist
countries.

Defence is not seen in its fullest system's context as being

a total system activity requiring a total system response.
In the past, western democratic nations have reacted to threats
and crises with graduated responses to bring about a resolution of
conflict.

Although, when these responses were grouped together to

constitute an overall strategy, they were highly summative in nature.
Seldom have western strategists viewed the threat of Soviet Communism
in its totality.
If this were to be done, then western military strategy in the
future would no longer consist of a series of responses built one upon another
but rather be comprised of a series of responses built in a constitutive
sense with the realization that the Soviet Communist threat is a total
systems one.
This is understandable since conflict is not accepted in western
democratic societies as being an inevitable ongoing process but rather
it is considered as a temporary condition brought on either by a breakdown
in international communication or a failure to adequately reach a social
consensus.
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While western military strategy has given the appearance of flexible
response to the Soviet nuclear challenge, this has been true more in
principle than in fact.
The lack of flexibility in western military strategy can be
accounted for by the tendency in western democratic nations to regard
defence policy decisions more as economic decisions than as political
decisions relating to continued survival.
In most western democratic nations, limited national resources are
provided for respective military establishments to carry out the variety
of tasks required to successfully challenge the Soviet Communist threat
which eclipses all spheres of potential conflict.

As a result, certain

areas of the west's potential counter-response to the more comprehensive
and flexible Soviet Communist challenge is not completely adequate.
Furthermore, the present development of sophisticated military
technology has broadened the scope of potential technological response
rather than limiting basic response capabilities.

The nuclear weapon

combined with computer technology has revolutionized military strategic
thinking.

The greater availability of military technology has encouraged

all competing parties to utilize that military technology to gain an
advantage.
Western democratic nations, limited by available funding, have
specialized their activities in certain areas to gain partial advantages.
However, partial advantages may prove to be insufficient in the broader
aspect of the west attaining final victory.
It is in this perspective that Canada pursue

a defence policy

that is both credible in terms of contributing to western military
strategy as well as being meaningful for a critical Canadian public.
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The Canadian dilemma has been one of attaining sufficient
independence or freedom of action in a situation of systems
interdependence with the United States.
This is a common dilemma found in all living open systems. As
stated previously, organization is the essence of all life. No living
open system can be totally self-sufficient or independent from other
living open systems.
However, a degree of relative independence is possible within
a situation of interdependence.

Since there is continuous competition

between system parts for systems dominance, it is logical to infer from
this fact that Canada could acquire a significant degree of relative
independence if she proceeded to play a more significant role in its
existing interdependent relationships.
For example, Canadian participation in NORAD could become more
active by bolstering her present contributions in terms of force strength
and strategic input.

NORAD's jurisdiction could conceivably be extended

to include much more than those problems relating to the air defence of
North America.

A revamped NORAD Alliance with a more active Canadian

partner could make significant contributions to the west's total system
strategy.
Also, increased Canadian participation and a general willingness
to initiate new ideas and new strategies would restore U.S. confidence
in Canada's commitment to the defence of the west.
On a national level, the defence of Canada should be considered
as a total system activity and not as a partial system activity.

Present

political conditions combined, with new military technology requires a
total system strategy.

It will no longer be sufficient to make partial summative responses to the
constitutive total system threat inherent in Soviet Communism, therefore
Canada's defence policy must be elevated beyond being an infrequent crisis
oriented activity to a position of primary importance in the list of government
concerns.
In regards to the use of general systems theory in social research, there
are certain limitations that must be clearly spelled out. For example, the
predictive capability of general systems theory is questioned on the same
grounds like other theories in the social sciences with reference to their
relative capability to make future predictions.
More specifically, the question of entropy and negentropy have not been
dequately resolved in the general literature due to the fact of incomplete
•esearch into the nature and causes of disorder. However, bearing these
.imitations in mind, there are no positive grounds for rejecting the utility
r

alue of general systems theory in providing a framework for explaining human

•eality.
The study of Canada's defence policy by the use of general systems theory
.s only one aspect of this human reality, namely systems survival,.._.-.-c-

~~

f
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